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BALDWIN’S REPUTATION : POLITICS
AND HISTORY, 1937–1967*
PH I L I P W I L L I AMSON
University of Durham
A B S T R ACT. In one fundamental sense, a British post-war consensus certainly existed : repudiation and
denigration of interwar governments and their leaders. Stanley Baldwin was the chief victim, as it became
widely believed during the 1940s that he had ‘ failed to rearm ’ the nation in the 1930s. Examination of the
history of Baldwin’s reputation after his retirement – precisely why and how it collapsed – reveals a striking
case of the contingent construction of historical interpretation. Partisan politics, legitimation of a new regime,
a Churchillian bandwagon, self-exoneration, and selective recollection together reinforced hindsight and a
wartime appetite for scapegoats to create a public myth, which despite manifest evidence to the contrary was
accepted as historical ‘ truth ’ by historians and other intellectuals. The main indictment was accepted even by
Baldwin’s appointed biographer, who added a further layer of supposed psychological deﬁciencies. Attempts
to establish an eﬀective defence were long constrained by oﬃcial secrecy and the force of Churchill’s post-war
prestige. Only during the 1960s did political distance and then the opening of government records lead to more
balanced historical assessments ; yet the myth had become so central to larger myths about the 1930s and
1940s that it persists in general belief.
When Stanley Baldwin retired as prime minister and Conservative party leader in
May 1937 several assessments of his career were possible, some critical but most of
them favourable : as Churchill wrote, he left oﬃce ‘ loaded with honours and
enshrined in public esteem’.1 Yet three years later his reputation collapsed, as an
extraordinary and in retrospect implausible degree of blame was focused upon
him, most notably by the pseudonymous ‘Cato ’ in Guilty men. During the 1940s
and early 1950s the hostile verdict became an historical ‘ truth’ – not just a public
belief but an academic orthodoxy, given apparent conﬁrmation by the ﬁrst
volume of Churchill’s war memoirs in 1948 and even by the book Baldwin
commissioned as a defence three years before his death in December 1947,
* I am grateful to the 4th Earl Baldwin of Bewdley for allowing me to consult and quote from family
papers of his grandfather and his father (hereafter cited as [Stanley] Baldwin additional papers and
W. [Windham] Baldwin papers, which are to join the Baldwin [political] papers and other Baldwiniana
in Cambridge University Library) ; to Duﬀ Hart-Davis and Lori Curtis at the McFarlin Library, Uni-
versity of Tulsa, for copies from the Hart-Davis papers ; to Peter Ghosh and Julia Stapleton for further
materials and suggestive ideas ; and to David Reynolds, Ross McKibbin, and his Oxford Modern
British History seminar, John Ramsden, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. I am further
indebted to the British Academy for a research readership during which this article was completed.
1 W. S. Churchill, The second world war, I : The gathering storm (London, 1948), p. 16, or in the more
common reset edition (hereafter cited as ‘1949 edn’), p. 18.
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G. M. Young’s biography of 1952. As leader Baldwin had on occasion aroused
considerable controversy, and his style of leadership attracted private complaints
from his colleagues ; but from 1940 the contemporary criticisms were magniﬁed
and new reproaches were added, becoming so dominant that they obscured other
qualities which had sustained, and which could explain, his long ascendancy
in public life. More was involved than an individual politician’s reputation.
Belittlement of Baldwin had become intrinsic to a broader denigration of interwar
British government, which was itself integral to a widely held understanding of
Britain’s wartime and post-war experiences. The resulting account of political
leadership since 1918 underpinned the reputations of many public ﬁgures from
1940 to the 1960s. Phrases or dispositions associated with Baldwin were taken to
characterize wider shortcomings in interwar public life, and a derided 1929
Conservative party poster slogan ‘Safety First ’, misleadingly attributed to him,
was used to condemn an entire phase of British political culture.
The chief points of the indictment were encapsulated in the shorthand of book
indexers. In Churchill’s memoirs these were ‘Baldwin, Rt. Hon. Stanley …
aversion to foreign problems’ and – on rearmament, notoriously – ‘confesses
putting party before country ’.2 Baldwin was said to have neglected in the
mid-1930s to ‘ tell the truth ’ about the German threat and to have ‘ failed to
rearm’ the country, from fear of ‘paciﬁst ’ opinion following the East Fulham
by-election of October 1933 and more particularly in order to win the 1935
general election. He was said to have ‘confessed’ as much when speaking with
‘appalling frankness ’ in the House of Commons on 12 November 1936:
Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and that we
must rearm, does anybody think that this paciﬁc democracy would have rallied to that cry
at that moment? I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election
from my point of view more certain.3
He had ‘misled the people ’, even ‘betrayed the nation’, and so bore a large and
peculiarly personal responsibility for Britain’s diplomatic humiliations in the late
1930s and military defeats in 1940 – in some accounts even more so than Neville
Chamberlain. From the early war years similar accusations were added in dom-
estic policies : Baldwin or cabinets under his inﬂuence had also obstructed all
signiﬁcant eﬀorts to overcome the interwar industrial and social problems.
The charges relating to Germany and rearmament were remarkably tenacious,
despite manifest public evidence to the contrary. In diﬃcult conditions the
National government had proceeded cautiously, and the adequacy of the speed,
scale, and scope of its responses were, and remain, legitimate matters of debate.
Nevertheless, it had warned of the German threat, and it had rearmed. On behalf
2 Ibid., p. 615 (1949 edn, p. 697). Churchill himself did not compile or sanction the index, which was
prepared by his publishers (information from David Reynolds) ; but see the text to which the ‘party
before country’ entry refers, below p. 143. The indexer for G. M. Young, Stanley Baldwin (London,
1952), had ‘Foreign Policy, S.B.’s lack of interest in ’ (p. 258).
3 House of Commons Debates, 5th ser. (HCD) 317, c. 1144 (12 Nov. 1936).
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of MacDonald’s cabinet, Baldwin from late 1933 spoke repeatedly of the dangers
from dictatorships ; in May 1934 he promised ‘parity ’ in air power with
Germany; and in July announced an expansion of the Royal Air Force. In March
1935 a defence white paper made the case for general rearmament. Opening the
1935 general election campaign as prime minister, Baldwin declared that he
would not continue in oﬃce unless he obtained power to strengthen all the armed
forces, and further defence white papers in 1936 and 1937 contained successively
more massive rearmament programmes.4 As Bassett showed in 1948, Baldwin’s
November 1936 passages had been misrepresented because quoted selectively. As
other sentences made clear, he had not said that he failed to seek a mandate for
rearmament in 1935; on the contrary, his comments on the diﬃculty with peace
opinion referred to earlier years – ‘I am speaking of 1933 and 1934’ – and he
spoke of securing a large majority for rearmament at the 1935 election.5 Yet
Bassett’s article made no initial impact on the prevailing verdict. Similarly, when
Baldwin’s second son published a reply to G. M. Young’s biography in 1955,6 its
challenge to the orthodox view had only limited eﬀects.
Only in the 1960s did specialist historians set aside the misrepresentations and
turn from apportionment of individual blame to explanation of collective inter-
actions, producing the balanced assessments now accepted in the superior general
histories.7 Yet the hostile verdict on Baldwin (‘ failed to rearm’) remains ingrained
in popular impressions, and is reiterated in reference works and by those osten-
sibly expressing informed opinion.8 It had become a myth – a public belief
resistant to counter-evidence and professional historical revision – which was
intrinsic to and sustained by larger myths about the ‘ low, dishonest ’ 1930s, the
‘ﬁnest hour ’ of 1940, and national regeneration under the wartime coalition and
post-war Labour governments.9 So strong were these myths that even as speciﬁc
issues began to be reinterpreted, they continued to shape the overall intellectual
and ethical scheme. For example, the generation of political leaders characterized
by ‘Cato ’ in 1940 as ‘ little men’ shrank still further in Mowat’s otherwise sensitive
4 K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, Baldwin (London, 1969), chs. 27–33, is the fullest examination. For
the public presentation, see also P. Williamson, Stanley Baldwin: Conservative leadership and national values
(Cambridge, 1999), ch. 10.
5 R. Bassett, ‘Telling the truth to the people: the myth of the Baldwin ‘‘confession’’ ’, Cambridge
Journal, 2 (1948–9), pp. 84–95, commenting on the full text of HCD 317, cc. 1143–5 (12 Nov. 1936).
6 A. W. Baldwin, My father : the true story (London, 1955).
7 For the November 1936 passages see e.g. Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 970–3, and
M. Ceadel, ‘ Interpreting East Fulham’, in C. Cook and J. Ramsden, eds., By-elections in British politics
(London, 1973), pp. 118–39, at pp. 119–23; and for a recent general verdict, P. F. Clarke, Hope and glory :
Britain, 1900–1990 (London, 1996), pp. 186–7: ‘ the rearmament programme was seriously begun under
Baldwin, pushed along more slowly than Churchill wanted but more quickly than the Opposition
advocated’.
8 In 2003 these included most current biographical dictionaries and encyclopaedias, and the
biography on the No. 10 Downing Street website.
9 For growing examination of such myths, see J. Baxendale and C. Pawling, Narrating the thirties : a
decade in the making (London, 1996) ; A. Calder, The myth of the blitz (London, 1991) ; and M. Smith, Britain
and 1940: history, myth and popular memory (London, 2000).
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1955 interwar history, to ‘pygmies ’.10 Moreover, assertions made in the late 1940s
and early 1950s to ‘explain ’ the supposed neglect on rearmament – Baldwin’s
‘complacency’, ‘ indolence’, indiﬀerence towards foreign issues – remained
central to many later accounts of his leadership, preserved as unquestioned
assumptions long after historians had discarded the original accusations and
had understood the collective processes of decision making and the diplomatic,
ﬁnancial, logistical, and political constraints on policy.
Why did Baldwin’s reputation collapse? Why was more blame attached
personally to Baldwin than collectively to the cabinet and its advisers, or even to
the opponents of rearmament? How did the worst possible accusations on
rearmament become axiomatic, irrespective of the evidence? How was this
related to the wider ‘myths ’ of the 1930s and 1940s? Why did the earliest attempts
to defend Baldwin’s reputation only broaden the criticism? How did reassessment
begin, and what obstacles did this face?
Examination of Baldwin’s reputation from his retirement in 1937 to the open-
ing of the government records in 1967 – the point when more adequate historical
scholarship became possible – provides a striking case of the contingent con-
struction of historical interpretation, and the fragilities of ‘contemporary history’.
Baldwin was a casualty of the ‘politics of history ’, literally so. Beginning in
partisan politics, the critical verdict against him was sanctioned by a compelling
hindsight and adopted widely for mutual advantage. Its dissemination served
ostensibly good public causes, yet demanded the doctoring of published speeches
and selective recollection, concealment, or plain dishonesty about its proponents’
own past actions or statements. It was extended by highly personal, almost per-
verse, choices by individual writers, and was challenged only under still stronger
personal motivations. Consideration of Baldwin’s reputation raises wider issues
about the signiﬁcance of ministerial memoirs, the status of psychological biogra-
phy, the constraints of oﬃcial secrecy and libel threats, the ability of powerful
public ﬁgures to shape accounts of the recent past, and the claims of amateur as
against professional historians. An overlap with the historiography of Neville
Chamberlain’s appeasement is evident,11 but the history of Baldwin’s reputation
is especially poignant as a counterpoint to the history of Churchill’s reputation.
From 1940 the two were interdependent, and moved in inverse proportion to
each other. Churchill’s apotheosis as a ‘maker of history’, in the double sense of a
successful wartime leader and the historian of his own life and times,12 in crucial
10 ‘Cato’, Guilty men (London, late 1940 edn), p. 21; C. L. Mowat, Britain between the wars, 1918–1940
(London, 1955; 1956 edn), p. 142.
11 See the pioneering work by D. C. Watt, ‘Appeasement: the rise of a revisionist school? ’, Political
Quarterly, 26 (1965), pp. 191–213, and idem, ‘The historiography of appeasement ’, in A. Sked and
C. Cook, eds., Crisis and controversy (London, 1976), pp. 110–29, and more recently D. Dutton, Neville
Chamberlain (London, 2001).
12 See esp. D. Reynolds, ‘Churchill’s writing of history: appeasement, autobiography and The
gathering storm ’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th ser., 11 (2001), pp. 221–47; J. Ramsden, Man
of the century : Winston Churchill and his legend since 1945 (London, 2002).
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respects required, as it certainly sustained, disparagement of Baldwin. Both reveal
important features of British public belief and intellectual standards during the
1940s and 1950s.
I
In the late 1930s Baldwin was the most respected ﬁgure in British public life. On
his retirement he received warm tributes not just from grateful Conservatives
and their National government partners, but also from members of the Labour
and Liberal oppositions and a remarkable range of further organizations and
individuals. Until early 1940 his good opinion as an elder statesman was valued
by both members and critics of the government, from Chamberlain to Eden, Duﬀ
Cooper, and, on the left, Bevin, Citrine, and Cripps. National, imperial, and
international bodies or causes sought him as a speaker, member, or chairman. In
December 1938 he headed a transatlantic appeal for ﬁnancial assistance for
Jewish and other ‘non-aryan’ refugees from Nazism, and during 1939 was twice
invited to speak and broadcast in North America as a world leader in the anti-
fascist and anti-communist causes.13 He was also in demand among the reading
public. From 1937 to 1939 volumes of his recent and past addresses were pub-
lished or republished and went into popular editions,14 while his new addresses
continued to receive extensive newspaper reports. There was said to be ‘keen
competition among publishers ’ to obtain his memoirs, described by one prepared
to oﬀer him a substantial advance payment as ‘ the book that the world is waiting
for ’.15
In contrast to other leading politicians, Churchill above all, Baldwin had well-
considered reasons for making no preparations to secure his future reputation.16
Nevertheless, after some reluctance he did assist an ‘ instant ’ popular book to
mark his retirement, in an episode which further indicates the heights from which
his reputation would later fall. This ‘ tribute ’, by the historian Arthur Bryant,
placed Baldwin among ‘ the great PrimeMinisters of all time’ for his work in social
reconciliation, preservation of British democracy, and recreation of Conservatism
as ‘a great national creed’. On the main point of later controversy it stated
13 See Williamson, Baldwin, pp. 3, 57–9, 260, 345–9; also letters on his retirement in Cambridge
University Library, Baldwin papers, vols. 152–7.
14 Service of our lives (London, 1937), together with On England (London, 1926), Our inheritance (London,
1928), and This torch of freedom (London, 1935; 4th edn 1937), republished in cheap editions during 1938.
To 1940 these had total sales exceeding 50,000: Guildhall Library London, Hodder and Stoughton
archives, 16312/3. There were also a Penguin paperback of On England in 1937; a new selection, This
torch I would hand to you, ed. R. Bennett (London, 1937) ; his broadcast Toronto lectures, An interpreter of
England (London, 1939) ; and a British Council leaﬂet, The Englishman (London, 1940), reprinted in
British life and thought (London, 1941).
15 Gower (Conservative party publicity oﬃcer), and Heath (of Hutchinson & Co.) to Bryant, 19, 21
Apr. 1937, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, Arthur Bryant papers,
C/41, C/39/2. G. P. Brett (president of Macmillans, USA) to H. Macmillan, 17 Aug. 1939, W. Baldwin
papers, proposed a Baldwin autobiography as likely to be ‘a really great book’.
16 See below, pp. 147–9.
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squarely that he had worked to ‘educate ’ the electorate on the need for stronger
defences, and at the 1935 election had sought and obtained a mandate for further
rearmament.17 As Bryant was a Conservative party educational oﬃcial and friend
of Baldwin these views are unsurprising. More signiﬁcant was the book’s purpose,
to publicize and attract subscribers for a new National Book Association (NBA),
which under Bryant’s editorship, and with clandestine Conservative Central
Oﬃce support, had been devised to resist the ideological inﬂuence of the Left
Book Club.18 Its organizers also wanted to undercut what they regarded as an
unsuitable, because narrowly conceived, rival, the Right Book Club, as they
believed that the socialist left and communists would be better resisted by a widely
based ‘national ’ appeal, embracing liberals, moderate labour, and the non-
committed as well as Conservatives. As the best symbol of this intention, they
persuaded Baldwin to become the NBA president. This was Baldwin as a positive
ideological force, where a ‘Baldwin book club’ (as some conceived it)19 launched
by a Baldwin ‘tribute ’ was considered capable of commanding large sales and
combating the Left Book Club’s remarkable success.
The NBA failed, partly due to business miscalculations, diﬃculties in book
commissioning, and poor editorial selections – with Bryant’s naive tolerance
towards fascist states subverting Baldwin’s ambition of rallying ‘central ’
opinion – but also because deteriorating international relations made the political
atmosphere less favourable to its aims. This deterioration also began to aﬀect
Baldwin’s reputation. Even at the time his 12 November 1936 passages had
seemed damaging. While his cabinet colleagues were bewildered by what
they regarded as a misleadingly weak account of their rearmament record,20
Conservative critics of the defence preparations treated his words as a ‘confession’
that the government ‘never faced rearmament ’ before 1935 for electoral reasons.21
But it was events during 1938 that gave momentum to this meaning, as hindsight
supplied politicians and commentators of various opinions with greater oppor-
tunities or pressures to ascribe blame. With the Austrian and Czechoslovakian
crises and the now huge scale of both German and British armaments making
17 A. Bryant, Stanley Baldwin: a tribute (London, 1937), pp. 5, 179, 183–5, 188.
18 For Bryant and the NBA, see J. Stapleton, Political intellectuals and public identities in Britain since 1850
(Manchester, 2001), pp. 118, 137–41; more generally, E. H. H. Green, Ideologies of Conservatism (Oxford,
2002), ch. 5.
19 Davidson to T. N. Graham, 8 Apr. 1937, House of Lords Record Oﬃce, Davidson papers, 230.
20 W. W. Hadley, Munich : before and after (London, 1944), p. 25; Neville to Hilda Chamberlain,
14 Nov. 1936, Birmingham University Library, Neville Chamberlain papers, NC 18/1/985; and n. 29
below for Halifax.
21 The Leo Amery diaries, ed. J. Barnes and D. Nicholson (2 vols., London, 1980–8), II, pp. 430, 433;
Winterton diary, 12 Nov. 1936, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Winterton papers ; The Austen Chamberlain
diary letters, ed. R. Self (London, 1993), p. 513; Lloyd in House of Lords Debates, 5th ser. (HLD) 103,
cc. 293–4 (19 Nov. 1936) ; Winston S. Churchill, V : Companion volume, ed. M. Gilbert (3 parts, London,
1979–82) (WSC, V), pt 2, p. 405, and W. S. Churchill, Step by step (London, 1939; 1947 edn), pp. 77–8.
All these critics had as members of the Conservative defence deputation heard Baldwin say much
the same, conﬁdentially and more cogently, the previous July: WSC, V, pt 2, pp. 286–9.
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earlier rearmament programmes seem inadequate, Baldwin’s November 1936
words oﬀered an easy and useful explanation for the failure of British de-
terrence – but only when presented as an admission of evasion, neglect, or delay,
and especially as an acceptance of personal responsibility.
Churchill’s selected speeches on defence and foreign policy, published after the
Anschluss to claim prophetic foresight in the past as his case for leadership in the
future, included a truncated extract from Baldwin’s November 1936 passages
which gave the impression that he had not called for any rearmament during the
1935 election.22 Despite an editorial assurance that ‘nowhere ’ was any Churchill
statement omitted for reasons of ‘political inconvenience ’, this manipulation of
Baldwin’s words required the unmarked excision from Churchill’s own speech
during that debate of his statement that Baldwin had ‘ fought, and largely won’
the election on rearmament.23 The selective Churchillian version of Baldwin’s
words was inﬂuential, and almost certainly the source for later misquotations ;
forty years later it was still being used by Martin Gilbert in Churchill’s oﬃcial
biography.24 During the Munich debates another anti-appeaser, Lord Lloyd,
responded to Baldwin’s call in the House of Lords for all-party co-operation to
accelerate national defence by charging him with ‘responsibility for failure to
rearm’.25 Over the next twelve months followers of Chamberlain, presumably
unaware that as chancellor of the exchequer he had determined the limits and
priorities for armaments expenditure in 1934–5, asserted that Baldwin’s ‘ refusal to
re-arm’ had made Chamberlain’s appeasement policies ‘ inevitable ’.26 This
interpretation was accepted by Chamberlain’s biographer, Keith Feiling, not-
withstanding the evidence about Chamberlain’s role in his private papers.27 The
charge featured in newspapers owned by Beaverbrook, who had conducted a
political feud with Baldwin since 1923 and would continue to pursue it long
after Baldwin’s death, establishing a hostile tone for much of the popular press
until the 1960s. On the day war began, Peter Howard’s Sunday Express column
stated that Baldwin ‘had not told the electors the truth about rearmament at the
22 W. S. Churchill, Arms and the covenant, ed. R. S. Churchill (London, 1938), pp. 385–6: the doctored
extract excludes Baldwin’s reference to Churchill’s share of responsibility as chancellor of the
exchequer for defence cuts in 1924–9; four further ellipses (three unmarked) aﬀect the meaning; and it
ends before Baldwin’s statement that at the 1935 election the government had sought and secured a
mandate for rearmament.
23 Ibid., p. 5, and compare Churchill’s words on pp. 375–6 with the original in HCD 317 cc. 1103–4
(12 Nov. 1936). A total of some 230 words were silently omitted.
24 Reynolds, ‘Churchill’s writing of history’, p. 231; M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, V : 1922–1939
(London, 1976), pp. 797–8. 25 HLD 110, c. 1416 (4 Oct. 1938).
26 J. P. L. Thomas to Baldwin, 12 Sept. 1939, Baldwin additional papers ;WSC, V, pt 3, p. 1238; The
diaries and letters of Robert Bernays 1932–1939, ed. N. Smart (London, 1996), p. 389.
27 K. Feiling, The life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1946), pp. 312–13. Feiling failed to observe that
before the 1935 election Chamberlain and Baldwin diﬀered over the presentation, not substance, of
rearmament. Chamberlain wanted it as the dominant, clear-cut, election issue; Baldwin presented it
more palatably as support for British international obligations: see M. Cowling, The impact of Hitler
(Cambridge, 1975), pp. 92–4; Williamson, Baldwin, pp. 51–2, 311–12.
B A L DW I N’S R E P U T A T I O N 133
1935 general election’.28 Amid the military defeats of June 1940 such views
seemed so compelling that even Halifax, one of Baldwin’s closest colleagues,
conceded a version of it, even though in November 1936 – in sentences omitted
from his republished speeches – he had responded to misunderstandings of
Baldwin’s passages with a categorical defence of the cabinet’s rearmament eﬀorts
since 1933.29 Halifax’s ﬁrst biographer, like Chamberlain’s, followed suit.30
In the Liberal and Labour parties criticism of past defence preparations was at
ﬁrst constrained by the embarrassment of their opposition to all rearmament
before October 1935, to unilateral ‘national ’ rearmament until July 1937, and to
military conscription in May 1939. Further to the left, early criticism of Baldwin’s
‘appalling frankness ’ passages was the reverse of the later orthodoxy: he had
misled voters at the 1935 election, but in order to increase rearmament, not by
postponing it.31 As anti-appeasement broadened politically from early 1938,
however, books by some liberal journalists, notably Douglas Reed and Malcolm
Muggeridge, adopted the increasingly conventional interpretation of the
passages.32 After Munich Arthur Salter, the Oxford University professor and MP
and former League of Nations oﬃcial, incorporated it in his general indictment of
Baldwin and the National government.33 It entered academic work also through
Labour intellectuals, in Harold Laski’s 1938 book on parliamentary government
and Ivor Jennings’s textbook on the British constitution, completed during the
Battle of Britain. From these beginnings, the frisson of constitutional impropriety
associated with Baldwin’s alleged ‘confession’ established a standard issue in
post-war political and constitutional treatises34 – without, it must be assumed,
their academic authors reading Baldwin’s original speech, or any ministerial
statements on rearmament before the 1935 election.
The main impetus for the hostile interpretation came in May to July 1940, with
military defeat, the change of government, a wave of popular and newspaper
criticism of earlier ministers, and the publication of Guilty men. Although the chief
28 Extract in Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 1056.
29 Compare Halifax diary, 6 June 1940, in earl of Birkenhead, Halifax (London, 1965), p. 458, with
HLD 103, cc. 309–10 (19 Nov. 1936), denying that time had been lost in defence preparations and that
ministers had failed to justify further rearmament before the election. These passages were excluded
from Halifax, Speeches on foreign policy (Oxford, 1940), p. 60.
30 A. C. Johnson, Viscount Halifax (London, 1941), pp. 373–4, which falsely presents him as more
advanced than Baldwin on defence.
31 A. Hutt, The post-war history of the British working class (London, 1937), pp. 276–7.
32 D. Reed, Insanity fair (London, Apr. 1938), pp. 186–7, and idem, Disgrace abounding (London, Mar.
1939), p. 157 ; M. Muggeridge, The thirties (London, 1940), pp. 188, 220.
33 Sir Arthur Salter, Security (London, 1939), esp. pp. 194–8, also idem, Personality in politics (London,
1947), pp. 72–3, 82.
34 H. J. Laski, Parliamentary government in England (London, 1938), p. 108; W. Ivor Jennings, The British
constitution (Cambridge, 1941: completed ‘during an air-raid warning’), pp. 216–17, elaborated in idem,
Cabinet government (Cambridge, 1959 edn), pp. 507–9, and idem, Party politics, II : The growth of parties
(Cambridge, 1961), pp. 317–25; H. Finer, The future of government (London, 1946), pp. 96–7; S. Bailey, ed.,
The British party system (London, 1952), pp. vi–vii, 166.
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purpose of Guilty men35 was to reignite a newspaper and parliamentary campaign
for the removal of Chamberlain and other ‘men of Munich’ from Churchill’s
new coalition cabinet, Baldwin ﬁgured prominently because its theme was not so
much appeasement as rearmament – an explanation for an inferiority of British
to German military hardware at Dunkirk.36 By dating ‘ the genesis of our military
misfortunes ’ from 1929, it adumbrated an account which others developed in
later polemics and histories. It implied a connection between inadequate re-
armament in the 1930s and failed economic policies since the 1920s. It asserted a
long-standing collusion between MacDonald and Baldwin to exclude Lloyd
George from government because he wanted action, even before their alleged
1931 ‘plot ’ to form the National government gave fuller scope to their com-
placency and inertness, condoning Hitler’s and Mussolini’s aggression while
ignoring Churchill’s warnings. It detached various Baldwin statements from their
original contexts and meanings – ‘ the bomber will always get through’, ‘no great
armaments ’, ‘my lips are sealed ’, an admission that future German aircraft
production had been underestimated – to create an account of inadequacy,
evasion, and insincerity.37 His November 1936 ‘ frankness ’ passages were pre-
sented as referring to the 1935 general election, an impression reinforced in the
book’s early printings by the East Fulham by-election being placed in 1935
rather than 1933 – a mistake corrected in later 1940 printings but reproduced,
without comment, in the 1998 reprint.38
Guilty men’s deﬁciencies as an account of the 1930s are now familiar : its ten-
dentious selection of ministerial statements, generous presentation of Churchill’s
stances, disingenuousness about Labour policies, and silence about Liberals.
Some of this might have been apparent even in 1940, if its provenance had been
known. The three authors, Michael Foot, Frank Owen, and Peter Howard, were
Beaverbrook journalists, all highly favoured by and personally devoted to their
employer. Their use of a pseudonym is usually explained as a device to avoid
annoying and embarrassing Beaverbrook, now a colleague of Chamberlainites
in the coalition government and improbably presented in their book as a saviour
of the nation, alongside Churchill, Bevin, and Morrison. But anonymity also
protected the book from imputations about the authors’ own attitudes and
associations during the 1930s. As respectively an ex-Liberal socialist, a Lloyd
George Liberal, and Beaverbrook’s chief ghost-writer, none had ever been
35 During the book’s numerous reprints in 1940, the pagination was altered. Like most other
commentaries, the page numbers given here as ‘1940’ are to the most common impressions, from
August 1940 onwards; references to the ﬁrst impression, reprinted by Penguin, are indicated by the
latter’s publication date of 1998.
36 For the circumstances, see P. Addison, The road to 1945 (London, 1975), pp. 107–12, and S. Aster,
‘ ‘‘Guilty men’’ : the case of Neville Chamberlain’, in R. Boyce and E. M. Robertson, eds., Paths to war
(London, 1989), pp. 233–68, at pp. 233–5.
37 Guilty men (1940), pp. 17–21, 23–7, 35–7 (1998, pp. 15–19, 21–5, 33–5).
38 Compare Guilty men (1998), pp. 29–30, with (1940), pp. 31–2, a point noted by Ceadel, ‘ Inter-
preting East Fulham’, p. 121. The correction of the by-election date made chronological nonsense of
the book’s argument about and dating of the Labour party’s qualiﬁed acceptance of rearmament.
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sympathetic towards Baldwin and all had reservations about Chamberlain’s
policies. Nevertheless, they had worked as editors or columnists for newspapers
which (in more of the book’s ﬂagrant silences) under Beaverbrook’s direction
were distinctly Chamberlainite – supporting appeasement and the Munich
agreement, criticizing Churchill’s hostility towards Germany, insisting until
August 1939 that there would be no war, complaining once it began about
mobilization measures, and remaining loyal to Chamberlain right up to his
downfall in May 1940.39 Foot had particular cause for disguise : as a Labour
candidate at the 1935 election, he had attacked Baldwin for seeking ‘a mandate
for rearmament ’.40
Guilty men is testimony to a transformation of perspectives during May and June
1940. It was a tract for the time, not history but a lampoon without pretence to
either balance or accuracy. As Foot himself later wrote, its ‘notoriety ’ was largely
due to ‘ the reckless and wanton nature of [its] charges ’.41 Nevertheless, it had not
just immediate success but an enduring inﬂuence, accorded ‘classic ’ status and
credited with establishing an orthodoxy for the next twenty years, even among
scholars.42 The book’s wartime popular appeal is easily intelligible : the shock of
defeat, fears of invasion, and a collective mood of deﬁance created an appetite for
ready explanations and scapegoats. By assembling earlier partisan criticisms into
a comprehensive indictment of government in the 1930s, Guilty men articulated a
sudden, angry, disillusionment with past leaders, made still stronger by a need to
believe in the nation’s essential soundness and capacity to survive, and by the
intense impressions and myth-making capacities of Dunkirk, the fall of France,
the Battle of Britain, the Blitz, and the broadcasts of Churchill and Priestley. In
this atmosphere, the hostile interpretation of ‘appalling frankness ’ and viliﬁcation
of Baldwin himself – ‘despised for failing to rearm’ – became common currency,
not only fed by the Beaverbrook press and other popular newspapers but
accepted even in the serious journals.43 It generated further waves of abusive
letters to Baldwin, already started by Howard’s August 1939 Express article. It
contributed to the strange episode of the removal for scrap metal of gates
and railings from Baldwin’s home at Astley Hall, apparently encouraged by
Beaverbrook. This in turn stimulated a vicious personal attack in the Daily Mirror
39 A. Wolridge Gordon, Peter Howard (London, 1969), pp. 71–98, 104–5; G. Williams, Firebrand: the
Frank Owen story (Worcester, 1993), pp. 34–50, 61–5; M. Jones, Michael Foot (London, 1994), pp. 69–72,
85–91; A. Chisholm and M. Davie, Beaverbrook (London, 1992), pp. 347–56, 366–8, 370–3, 380–3;
R. Cockett, Twilight of truth (London, 1989), pp. 56–7, 74–5, 80–1, 94–6, 119, 156–7, 174.
40 Monmouthshire Beacon, 1, 8 Nov. 1935. For his early 1930s career as a paciﬁst, see S. Hoggart and
D. Leigh, Michael Foot (London, 1981), pp. 45–6, 52–4, 61–2.
41 ‘Cassius’ (M. Foot), The trial of Mussolini (London, 1943), p. 1.
42 E.g. 1998 Guilty men reprint in the ‘Twentieth-Century Classics ’ Penguin series, pp. xviii,
xxiv–xxv.
43 The diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, II : 1939–1965, ed. K. Young (London, 1980), p. 193 (6 Sept.
1942), and e.g. H. Fyfe, ‘Leadership and democracy’, Nineteenth Century, 129 (May 1941), pp. 470–1;
Economist, 9 May 1942, p. 637; Times, 20 Nov. 1943, pp. 5f.
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by ‘Cassandra ’ (William Connor)44 and the egregious House of Commons com-
ment by a Conservative MP, Alan Graham – who during the 1935 election had
strongly supported Baldwin’s case for rearmament – that it was ‘very necessary to
leave Lord Baldwin his gates in order to protect him from the just indignation of
the mob’.45 By the time the Guilty men authors were publicly identiﬁed in 1944,
their interpretation had become so widely accepted that any doubts about their
own records during the 1930s could not weaken its hold.
What may seem harder to understand is the afterlife and ampliﬁcation of the
‘guilty men’ interpretation among politicians, publicists, and academics. For this
there are both general and particular reasons. The general explanation turns on
the same simple device that appealed so strongly in 1940. By concentrating upon
just a few ‘guilty men’, Foot, Owen, and Howard unwittingly hit upon a
peculiarly convenient understanding of the recent past. It was easier to argue by
character assassination46 than to investigate the economic, strategic, and logistical
constraints on policy ; or to recall how diﬀerent the military demands of 1940 were
from those which anyone, including Churchill, had expected, even as late as
1939 ; or, in what was very much an insular discussion, to weigh the proximate
cause of Dunkirk, the collapse of the French army. It was also an account which
combined the satisfying qualities of hindsight, a stark contrast between right and
wrong, and a dramatic and damning denouement. However, the convenience
was less evidential and literary than political, ideological, and moral. The ‘guilty ’
were particular individuals – not the political, social, or economic system, not any
one class nor any of the political parties, nor any newspapers (or their owners). By
casting a harsh light on a few statements by the retired Baldwin and defeated
Chamberlainites, the now unfortunate past statements of almost every other in-
dividual, group, and party could be consigned to decent obscurity. Many groups
and individuals of quite diﬀerent persuasions could reconcile themselves to some
version of this account. Even the Conservative party was not denied exoneration,
because the interpretation showed that in Churchill, Eden, Amery, and other
anti-appeasers there were ‘good’ Conservatives as well as ‘guilty ’ ones ; and while
many Conservatives might for a time dislike the attack on leaders and policies
they had recently supported, it contained nothing objectionable in principle to
Conservatism.
Above all, the ‘guilty men’ interpretation came to register the convergence of
the Labour and Liberal parties with Conservative dissidents after the Munich
debate, consummated in the coalition of May 1940 (with Beaverbrook as a late
arrival) and invested with intense patriotic and moral force by national survival,
the ‘people’s war’, commitment to welfare reform, the crusade against fascist
barbarity, and military victory. What, it transpired, had happened in May 1940
44 Baldwin, My father, pp. 313–22; Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 1056–61; Daily Mirror,
27 Feb. 1942.
45 HCD 378, c. 627 (4 Mar. 1942) ; cf. Graham speeches in Birkenhead News, 30 Oct., 6, 9, 13 Nov.
1935. 46 The useful term in Dutton, Chamberlain, p. 77.
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was not just a change of government but the end of a regime and creation of a
new political order. This rupture enabled the wartime coalition partners and
their followers to redeem or reinvent their ideological and moral credentials,
whether as patriots, democrats, or social progressives, and to imply retrospective
membership of what became a surprisingly large band of pre-war fellow-travellers
with Churchill – the vital badge of respectability in post-war politics. As the
‘guilty men’ interpretation supplied a foundation story for this new regime and
a legitimation for these new commitments, many public ﬁgures acquired a stake
in its credibility. The larger the stake, whether because pre-war positions
required concealment or excuse, or because wartime and post-war positions were
asserted as indefeasible, the more convenient the alleged inadequacy of the ‘guilty
men’ became. While Eden and other Conservative dissidents had the diﬃculty of
absolving their membership of or support for Baldwin’s and Chamberlain’s
governments until 1938 – and Beaverbrook and most other Conservatives until
1940 – the internationalists, socialists, Labour, and Liberals had potentially
still greater embarrassment as opponents even of the National government’s
rearmament, let alone Churchill’s calls for accelerated rearmament.
I I
All this did not occur at once, as the hostile verdict spread more slowly among
politicians and publicists than the reading public. The particular reasons for its
development lay in the political struggles of the remainder of the 1940s. Argu-
ments about current issues generated similar accounts of the recent past.
In May 1940 the coalition government partners agreed for the sake of national
unity to refrain from recriminations against pre-war ministers, and until 1945
one prop of the wartime electoral truce was the formula that all parties shared
the blame for any earlier shortcomings in defence and foreign policies.47 Given
their own records this suited Labour and Liberal leaders as much as former
Chamberlainites, and this ‘oﬃcial ’ account of mutual responsibility received
some support in wider debate, certainly into 1941.48 The broader left, however,
experienced a similarly abrupt change of perspective to that of the Guilty men
authors : Naomi Mitchison noted in June 1940 how ‘very odd’ it was to ﬁnd the
New Statesmen ‘going all militarist, blaming the government because it ‘‘postponed
conscription to the last moment ’’ etc. ’.49 Some radical publicists and politicians
regarded the military defeats and alleged government failure as such fertile
material for discrediting the Conservative party that deﬁance of their own party
leaders and the political truce became a point of principle. It was concealed
or forgotten that everyone on the left – from Liberal to Communist – had, as
47 Addison, Road to 1945, pp. 108–11.
48 E.g. G. Mander, We were not all wrong (London, 1941; repr. 1944), p. 1.
49 Among you taking notes : the wartime diary of Naomi Mitchison 1939–1945, ed. D. Sheridan (London,
1985), p. 62. For the New Statesman’s opposition to rearmament until early 1939, see B. Morris, The roots
of appeasement (London, 1991), pp. 26, 65, 73, 118, 134, 156, 176.
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leading campaign themes at the 1935 election, publicly acknowledged that
Baldwin wanted (in the words of the Labour party manifesto) a ‘vast and ex-
pensive rearmament ’. The most violent was A. L. Rowse, with his paradoxical
mixture of Marxist, Lib-Lab, Keynesian, and Churchillian views, extraordinary
egotism, and hatred of businessman-politicians. In Political Quarterly articles from
1938 to 1940 he anticipated some of the Guilty men charges, including the mis-
representation of Baldwin’s November 1936 passages. But in a July 1941 article,
republished in 1947, which even his editor thought psychologically false and
potentially libellous, he pressed the accusations against Baldwin still further : an
‘ inferior man’, dishonest and hypocritical, governing by ‘ fraud’ and ‘conﬁdence
trick ’, and ‘betraying’ the British people ‘more completely than we have ever
known in our history’.50 Yet as a Labour candidate at the 1935 election Rowse
had opposed Baldwin’s advocacy of rearmament by declaring it a ‘plain truth ’
that Britain was already ‘perfectly well equipped for all defensive purposes ’.51
The ‘guilty men’ accusations were also reiterated in popular political tracts,
mostly in a series from Gollancz, publisher of the Left Book Club and Guilty men,
but also in Penguin ‘ specials ’, and written by the radical Liberal MPs Geoﬀrey
Mander and T. L. Horabin as well as by socialist publicists. Mander’s 1941 book,
attacking the coalition government formula that ‘we were all wrong’ in the 1930s,
was an early claim that the Labour and Liberal parties had been essentially
Churchillian – ‘many … were absolutely right ’ – achieved by emphasizing their
eventual support for armed collective security while suppressing their (and his
own) opposition to most national defence measures.52 But the other tracts
followed Guilty men in concentrating on ‘exposures ’ of alleged Conservative
‘misdeeds ’, dishonesty, and sympathy with fascism (‘Tory Dictatorship ’), and
several produced Baldwin’s ‘dishonourable deception’ in 1935 as a prize exhibit.
The electoral purpose was usually explicit. Most were published or, like Guilty men,
republished in 1944–5, in anticipation of a post-war election. Your M.P. by Tom
Wintringham, the Marxist ex-International Brigade oﬃcer and Common Wealth
party publicist, declared that Baldwin’s November 1936 passages ‘alone ought to
defeat every Tory MP at the next election’.53 In a few cases the accusations were
even extended to Churchill, on the grounds of his long hostility towards
Soviet Russia. But as the 1945 Nuﬃeld election study noted, the chief value of
such partisan accounts of the 1930s for the political left was that they normally
50 Letters of Leonard Woolf, ed. F. Spotts (London, 1989), pp. 426–7; A. L. Rowse, ‘Reﬂections on
Lord Baldwin’, Political Quarterly, 12 (1941), pp. 305–17; idem, The end of the epoch (London, 1947),
pp. 77–89 and passim, themes reiterated ad nauseum in later works, e.g. The later Churchills (London,
1958) and All Souls and appeasement (London, 1961).
51 Falmouth Packet, 8 Nov. 1935, and similarly Cornish Echo, 25 Oct., 1, 8 Nov. 1935.
52 Mander, We were not all wrong, esp. pp. 9–15, and compare with his speeches in HCD 292,
cc. 2389–96, 2443–4; 299, cc. 127–34, 161–2; 346, cc. 1458–9. Mander, like Horabin, joined the
Labour party after 1945.
53 ‘Gracchus’ [T. Wintringham], Your M.P. (London, 1944), pp. 18–19; and see T. L. Horabin,
Politics made plain (London, 1944), esp. pp. 47–8; ‘Diplomaticus’ [K. Zilliacus], Can the Tories win the
peace? And how they lost the last one (London, 1945), pp. 34–40.
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contrasted Churchill to other Conservatives, making it possible to attack the
Conservative party without criticizing a popular wartime leader. Better still, they
enabled Churchill’s criticisms of Conservative ministers during the 1930s to be
used against the Conservative party.54
As the party truce dissolved into preparations for a post-war election in 1945,
and with pre-war Labour resistance to rearmament now distanced by the war and
coalition government, this tactic became attractive within the oﬃcial Labour
party. During the worst of the wartime abuse Ernest Bevin as minister of labour
had told Baldwin of his anger that he was being blamed for ‘a national failure, for
which no one could escape responsibility ’, a view of pre-war foreign and defence
policies which he restated in the House of Commons during 1941. Yet such were
the temptations of ready-made electoral ammunition that in April 1945 Bevin
spoke publicly of the Conservatives having ‘completely failed to prepare for
defence’, and of the 1935 election as being ‘won on a lie – a self-confessed lie ’ by
Baldwin.55 Yet the idea of Conservative ‘guilt ’ had been so well disseminated
by the wartime tracts that Labour leaders had little need to risk challenges on the
point. Aside from one party election leaﬂet (‘The guilty party ’) and criticism of
Churchill’s caretaker government for including former Chamberlainites, the
accusations mostly arose spontaneously from audiences at election meetings.56
After the Labour election victory the recent past continued to be a live political
issue, as Labour ministers – Morrison especially, as leader of the House of
Commons – tried to protect themselves against Conservative exploitation of the
government’s diﬃculties by taunts against Conservative policies in the 1920s
and 1930s.57 By these means, the charges against Baldwin were transmitted into
Labour party histories and the memoirs of Labour politicians.
Some Conservative replies to the wartime polemics were attempted. One party
election leaﬂet declared that against ‘ socialist ’ opposition the National govern-
ment had created the RAF and Royal Navy that had prevented invasion in 1940,
while three others borrowed the radical titles of ‘Guilty Men’ and ‘Your M.P. ’ to
list Labour statements and divisions against armaments, and to name the Labour
and Liberal MPs who had voted against conscription.58 Several unoﬃcial tracts
extended this device, exposing Labour and Liberal hypocrisy over rearmament
by adopting the Guilty men tactic of extracts from speeches. The most substantial
was Quintin Hogg’s The left was never right, which attempted to create an inclusive
54 R. B. McCallum and A. Readman, The British general election of 1945 (Oxford, 1947), pp. 50–1; also
W. Harrington and P. Young, The 1945 revolution (London, 1978), pp. 55–6, 59–60, 66–7.
55 A. Bullock, Ernest Bevin : minister of labour, 1940–1945 (London, 1967), pp. 113, 368;HCD 373, c. 1362
(29 July 1941) ; Times, 9 Apr. 1945.
56 McCallum and Readman, General election of 1945, p. 50; Cripps and Greenwood in Times, 21 June
1945.
57 Compare, e.g., Morrison speech in Times, 13 Jan. 1948, with his earlier ﬁerce opposition to
rearmament, ibid., 8 Nov. 1935, and wartime acceptance of shared responsibility, News Chronicle,
13 June 1940, and Times, 17 July 1942. Morrison later invented a ﬁctional political past for himself
in which, inter alia, he had not in 1931 voted for unemployment beneﬁt cuts nor wanted to join
the National government. 58 Conservative party pamphlets and leaﬂets, 1945/20, 27–8, 48.
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Conservative interpretation. Churchill had usually been right, while the National
government, after initially underestimating the German threat, did eventually
rearm the nation and take realistic decisions. In contrast Labour and the Liberals
had always been wrong-headed, and opposed all sensible action : ‘Better a million
Baldwins or ten thousand Chamberlains than an Attlee ’ in 1934–5. The Gollancz
authors had made a ‘travesty ’ of Baldwin’s November 1936 passages ; it was a
‘ simple, historical fact ’ that the 1935 election had been fought on his ‘demand to
rearm on a very considerable scale ’.59
As history Hogg’s book was superior in accuracy and argument to Guilty men,
but the politics were against it. No sustained Conservative counter-oﬀensive de-
veloped. Defence of the National government was hardly a concern for Churchill
and Conservative critics of Munich nor, now, for Beaverbrook, who provided the
party’s chief newspaper support ; and for most other Conservatives the eﬀort to
defend rearmament policies without implying criticism of Churchill, their main
electoral asset, was too diﬃcult. Baldwin, the politician with the widest pre-war
electoral appeal, was now ignored in his party’s election literature and speeches.60
Conservative politics did not, then, generate a favourable or even balanced
historical assessment of rearmament in the 1930s. Instead, after the 1945 election
defeat the critical verdict was appropriated and reaﬃrmed for Conservatives, in
the ﬁrst volume of Churchill’s war memoirs. It is now well understood that
Churchill’s diﬀerences with government defence and foreign policies were less
substantial and constant than he and almost all commentators would claim after
1939, and that The gathering storm gave a highly partisan account of the 1930s, which
depended on a questionable assessment of how Hitler might have been deterred.61
Less obvious is the ﬂuctuation in Churchill’s attitudes towards Baldwin. Certainly
he had been critical of delays in rearmament, and in private was frequently caustic
towards him. But during the run-up to the 1935 election Churchill publicly
pledged to support Baldwin as ‘a statesman who has gathered to himself a greater
volume of conﬁdence and goodwill than any other man I recollect in my long
public career ’ – a position which he privately told Baldwin was ‘ indispensable to
our safety at the present time’, indeed a ‘blessing ’.62 While in part an obvious
attempt to ingratiate himself back into government oﬃce, these statements also
expressed a deeper concern: that in the face of Labour, Liberal, and peace
59 Q. Hogg, The left was never right (London, 1945), pp. 48, 57, 59–60, 63–4. For general Conservative
responses, see Harrington and Young, The 1945 revolution, pp. 53, 63–7. The other tracts were Hadley,
Munich, pp. 21–6; B. Webb, The house divided (London, 1945) ; E. D. O’Brien, Big 3 or big 212 ? (London,
1945) ; and ‘Talus ’, Your alternative government (London, 1945).
60 J. Ramsden, The age of Churchill and Eden (London, 1995), p. 80.
61 Important early reassessments were R. Rhodes James, Churchill : a study in failure (London, 1970),
and Cowling, Impact of Hitler.More recent comments are D. C. Watt, ‘Churchill and appeasement ’, in
R. Blake andW. R. Louis, eds., Churchill (Oxford, 1993), pp. 199–214; Reynolds, ‘Churchill’s writing of
history’, esp. pp. 228–45; Ramsden, Man of the century, pp. 195–6, 205–9.
62 Conservative party conference speech, Times, 4 Oct. 1935, p. 8c (a defence speech omitted from
Arms and the covenant) ; Churchill to Baldwin, 9 July, 7 Oct. 1935, inWSC, V, pt 2, pp. 1210, 1289, and see
p. 1213.
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opinion, Baldwin was best placed to win an election majority that would preserve
the 1935 rearmament measures, described by Churchill as ‘a most formidable and
tremendous advance in British defence’.63 After the National government had
been re-elected and it became clear that Baldwin would not appoint him, he
resumed his criticism. As prime minister in 1940, however, Churchill insisted on
ministerial resistance to recriminations against the leaders of the 1930s, in his
18 June ‘ﬁnest hour ’ speech deprecating any ‘quarrel between the past and the
present ’ as jeopardizing ‘ the future ’.64 Conscious of the public abuse that Baldwin
was suﬀering, Churchill was kind towards him, on three occasions entertaining
him in Downing Street, asking his opinion on current issues and sympathetically
recalling their diﬀerences during the 1930s.65 After beginning work on his war
memoirs he sent ‘a message of comfort ’ assuring Baldwin that he would be ‘dealt
with gently in the forthcoming book’.66 After Baldwin’s death and the publication
of The gathering storm, Churchill accepted Baldwin’s son’s invitation to dedicate the
memorial to him at Astley in May 1950, speaking of him as ‘ the most formidable
politician I have ever known’ and (albeit with signiﬁcant qualiﬁcation) ‘ in
domestic politics … one of the most capable leaders … for many generations ’.67
Why, then, did Churchill suspend his generous sentiments towards Baldwin
when writing The gathering storm, even commenting privately that ‘ it would have
been much better if he had never lived’?68 As an autobiographer, biographer,
and historian as well as a politician with an unusually controversial record,
Churchill was sensitive to the importance of understandings of the past for
present politics, alert to their possibilities and dangers, and accustomed to treating
them as a ﬂexible resource. Striking instances in his political practice include the
manipulation not just of his own and Baldwin’s statements about the 1935 elec-
tion, but also of the phrase ‘ the years of the locust ’. First coined by ministers to
describe a period which emphasized Churchill’s defence cuts while chancellor of
exchequer during the 1920s, he instantly redeﬁned and popularized it (to
enduring eﬀect) as applying to the years of the National government’s responsi-
bility for armaments in the early 1930s.69 This pragmatic use of the past also
inﬂuenced the ﬁrst volume of The second world war. Originally intended precisely as
the start of his memoirs of the war, during 1947 and early 1948 he extensively
recast it to include a much longer account of the interwar years. The expansion
of this section from ﬁve to twenty-one chapters70 was hardly motivated by
63 HCD 302, cc. 423, 427 (22 May 1935). 64 W. S. Churchill, Into battle (London, 1941), p. 226.
65 M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, VII : 1941–1945 (London, 1986), p. 1040, for Oct. 1944; the other
meetings were in February 1943 and April 1945, for which see below p. 153.
66 W. Baldwin note, undated, W. Baldwin papers.
67 Times, 22 May 1950, and see Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, Churchill papers, CHUR
2/312, and material in W. Baldwin papers. Churchill later contributed £20 (in 2003 values, over £350)
to the memorial’s maintenance fund.
68 1947 statement quoted in M. Gilbert, In search of Churchill (London, 1994), pp. 105–6.
69 Compare Inskip, HCD 317 cc. 742 (10 Nov. 1936), also Baldwin, c. 1143 (12 Nov.) with Churchill,
cc. 1101, 1107 (12 Nov.) ; Churchill, Step by step, p. 77, and Gathering storm, ch. V : ‘The locust years,
1931–1935’. 70 Reynolds, ‘Churchill’s writing of history’, p. 224.
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self-vindication alone : none doubted after 1940 that his criticisms of the National
government had been ‘right ’. Contemporary concerns were more pressing.
Humiliated by his 1945 election defeat and no longer in government, after his
Fulton speech in March 1946 warning of the threat from Soviet Russia he had
regained an international role by re-enacting his pre-war warnings against the
threat from Nazi Germany. The redrafted interwar chapters would underpin this
position as a Cold War prophet and the champion of both Anglo-American
co-operation and a ‘United Europe’, by reclaiming his credentials as a uniquely
successful diagnostician of military threat and by presenting events in the 1930s
as ‘ lessons ’ for the late 1940s and the future.71 However diﬀerent in style,
The gathering storm was, like Guilty men, a tract for the times. The eﬀects for
Baldwin’s reputation were similar. Again, the causes of the war and military
defeat were attributed more to British ‘unwisdom’ than to German aggression or
the French collapse, and again the blame fell largely on individuals. The root
of the diﬃculties again lay in the 1920s, though not (as it could not be, given
Churchill’s tenure of the Treasury) in economic policies, but in the defeat of
the Lloyd George Coalition in 1922, which made Baldwin ‘ the ruling force
in British politics ’ within a ‘Baldwin-MacDonald Regime’.72 Again Baldwin,
even more than Chamberlain, was the key ﬁgure, because Churchill asserted
that until 1936 the war could have been prevented if only Baldwin had kept his
pledge to preserve air parity.73 Churchill’s ‘ statesman’ of 1935 was now dimin-
ished to a ‘party manager ’, thinking ‘ in majorities and aiming for a quiet life
between elections ’.74 Dominating an ‘administration more disastrous than any
in our history ’, Baldwin refused ‘ to face unpleasant facts ’, lacked knowledge
and interest in foreign issues, and wanted ‘peace at any price ’.75 Many of
Churchill’s own warnings were quoted, but none of Baldwin’s. Much was made
of Baldwin’s statement in May 1935 that he had been ‘wrong’ about future
German aircraft production (‘a shocking confession’),76 but for the government
little was noted apart from the July 1934 RAF programme (‘belated and
inadequate ’) and secret ministerial consultations with Churchill on defence inno-
vations. There was no indication of the successive increases and accelerations in
RAF construction, nor even of the 1935, 1936, and 1937 defence white papers.
The mangled extract from Baldwin’s November 1936 passages reappeared as an
‘avow[al] that he had not done his duty in regard to national safety because he
was afraid of losing the election’.77
71 Ibid., pp. 222, 227–8; Ramsden, Man of the century, ch. 4. Explicit statements include
W. S. Churchill, Sinews of peace : post-war speeches (London, 1948), dustcover and p. v ; and Gathering storm,
pp. vii–viii, 14, 33, 162, 165 (1949 edn, pp. ix–x, 16–17, 186, 190).
72 Gathering storm, pp. 16–17 (1949 edn, pp. 18–19).
73 Ibid., pp. 72, 90–1, 93, 101, 115, 129, 180 (1949 edn, pp. 83, 103, 106, 115–16, 132, 207).
74 An insistent point, with the belittlement accentuated by successive adjectives – a ‘great ’,
‘ remarkable’, ‘profoundly astute ’ party manager: ibid., pp. 26, 141, 157 (1949 edn, pp. 30, 162, 181).
75 Ibid., pp. 141, 69, 137 (1949 edn, pp. 162, 80, 157).
76 Ibid., pp. 97–9 (1949 edn, pp. 111–13). 77 Ibid., p. 169, also p. 88 (1949 edn, pp. 195, 100–1).
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The gathering storm had an immense impact on interpretations of the 1930s. It
had the literary power, epic qualities, and use of documents – helped by expert
researchers and advisers – that made it seem exceptionally informed and auth-
oritative. Above all, Churchill’s extraordinary post-war international prestige and
the massive sales of his book and its widely syndicated extracts transformed his
personal interpretation into world history. It was not only endorsed by his war-
time political and military associates, but embraced uncritically by intellectuals
and historians who lionized him as a new Gibbon or Macaulay; and it estab-
lished a political and moral perspective that even now remains inﬂuential in the
imaginations of British and United States leaders.78 Churchill’s account was not
derived from Guilty men and its radical successors, any more than he shared their
political sympathies. The Labour and Liberal parties were not spared for being
‘completely wrong and mistaken’ on armaments until 1936 and failing in ‘duty ’
on conscription in 1939: they too, with the National government, were ‘deeply
blameworthy before history’.79 As party conﬂict again sharpened from 1947,
Churchill as Conservative opposition leader had the ironic task of defending
his party against continued Labour use of the ‘guilty men’ charges – counter-
attacking with sarcasm on the Labour record during the 1930s, and threatening
that if Labour ministers tried at the next general election ‘to revive these former
controversies ’ the Conservatives would publish a record of their past ‘utter-
ances ’.80 Nevertheless, despite the diﬀerent perspectives of the two books,
The gathering storm seemed to conﬁrm the Guilty men accusations. It also extended
the contemporary convenience of the repudiation of the leaders of the 1930s.
By rallying to Churchill historically as well as politically the Conservative party
now had a more presentable past to underpin their party’s political recovery,
while everyone on the left could continue to swim with the tide, adopting
his indictment of the National government while ignoring his criticism of
their own parties. From the late 1940s this shared account was reinforced
by further ostensibly authoritative histories of the 1930s, from academics with
particular reasons to deplore ‘appeasement ’ and by The Times’s repudiation of
its past support for Baldwin and Chamberlain written by a radical friend of
Beaverbrook.81 In these conditions, such plausible criticisms of the National
government as having collectively failed to rearm ‘adequately ’ or ‘quickly
78 See Reynolds, ‘Churchill’s writing of history’, pp. 222–3, and Ramsden, Man of the century, ch. 3.
79 Gathering storm, pp. 66, 69–70, 88, 90–1, 98–9, 278 (1949 edn, pp. 76, 80, 100, 102–3, 111–13, 319).
80 W. S. Churchill, Europe unite : speeches 1947 and 1948 (London, 1950), pp. 50–1, 74, 432, also 232–3,
where Churchill dryly advised ‘all Parties to leave the past to history, especially as I propose to write
that history myself ’. For him ignoring his own advice, see 1950–1 speeches in idem, In the balance
(London, 1951), pp. 363–4, and Stemming the tide (London, 1953), pp. 25, 122, 142–3, 171.
81 J. Wheeler-Bennett, British editor of the captured German foreign oﬃce documents, in his
Munich (London, 1948), esp. pp. 229–30, 243–5, 250, 254, 264, 433–4; L. Namier, a Jewish admirer of
Churchill, endorsing The Gathering storm interpretation in his Europe in decay (London, 1950), pp. 150–70;
[Stanley Morison], The history of the Times, V, pt 2: 1921–1948 (London, 1952), pp. 1009–13, 1023
(notwithstanding the bibliography, p. 1139, accepting Bassett’s disposal of the ‘popular myth’ about
Baldwin’s 1936 ‘confession’).
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enough’ were habitually abridged – as they commonly still are – into the entirely
false shorthand that ‘Baldwin failed to rearm’. Baldwin’s speeches warning about
fascism, defending democracy, and justifying rearmament were overlooked and
forgotten, because these contradicted the far stronger assumptions that he had
completely misjudged the dictators.
Moreover, during these early years of the welfare state, economic manage-
ment, and full employment, further criticisms were added, again as Guilty men
had pre-ﬁgured: an imputed link between failures in defence and foreign policies,
and the industrial troubles, unemployment, and social hardship of the 1920s and
1930s. The Churchill wartime government’s eﬀorts for reconstruction, as well as
the reforms of the 1945 Labour government, assumed inadequacies in interwar
economic and social policies, which commentators and politicians on the
left – including further authors in the 1943–5 Gollancz series – could easily
attribute to the indiﬀerence, complacency, or class interest of Conservative
ministers. After 1945 Churchill tried to counteract what he variously described as
this ‘extraordinary myth’, ‘ legend’, ‘ falsehood’, and ‘ lie ’ – particularly after
Attlee publicly called him ‘the most disastrous Chancellor of the century ’ – by
defending the social reforms of Baldwin’s 1924–9 government and speaking of the
‘constant, ceaseless progress … made in the social life of the people ’ under both
Conservative and National governments.82 But here too interpretations of the
interwar period slipped from party conﬂict into a broadly agreed version of
the recent past. From 1947 and particularly after their narrow 1951 election
victory the Conservative leaders accepted some of the fundamental measures and
techniques of the Labour government, implicitly repudiating the attitudes and
policies of Baldwinite Conservatism.
What emerged was a fused Churchillian–Labour–Keynesian interpretation
dismissive towards government in the 1920s and 1930s, accompanied by hostile
commentaries from Beaverbrook and his columnists and reviewers. This histori-
cal consensus had considerable public importance, as the real substance under-
lying the so-called ‘political consensus ’ of the 1950s. Given these political,
ideological, and populist currents and their powerful moral charge, denigration of
Baldwin and Chamberlain became intellectual and cultural norms which few had
the incentive to question.
It might have been worse, if the one episode almost universally credited to
Baldwin had been reopened to controversy. With diﬃculty, the duke of Windsor’s
legal advisers persuaded him not to base his 1951 memoirs of the abdication on
‘aggressive and vindictive ’ notes supplied by Beaverbrook, which presented
Baldwin as an ‘ intriguer ’ forcing the king oﬀ the throne ‘ in order to retrieve his
own political fortunes ’.83
82 Gilbert, Churchill, VIII : 1945–1965 (London, 1988), pp. 322–3; Churchill, Europe unite, pp. 88–90,
114–15, 143, 203; idem, In the balance, pp. 110, 183, 192–3, 220–1.
83 W. Monckton and G. Allen notes, 4, 21 Oct. 1949; duke of Windsor to Monckton, 24 Oct. 1949;
Monckton to Allen, 11 Sept. 1950, Bodleian Library, Monckton Trustees papers, 20/92–3, 105–7, 111.
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Baldwin retained a loyal group of friends, and received some sympathetic letters.
But few oﬀered a public defence. Those meaning to be generous usually made no
attempt to refute the criticisms, but in extenuation stressed his other qualities and
achievements. When, with the customary respect for former prime ministers,
both houses of parliament adjourned after Baldwin’s death in December 1947,
speakers from all parties praised his personal character, devotion to the House
of Commons, and love for and embodiment of a version of ‘England’. Some
newspaper obituarists dwelt on his ‘understanding of his countrymen’, or
resorted to appealing to ‘history’ as likely to ‘ judge that he was too severely
censured’.84 Both those oﬀering Baldwin wartime comfort and the more favour-
able obituarists did invoke the obvious alternative interpretation of his career,
sketched by Bryant in 1937: he had helped assimilate the Labour movement
to parliamentary government and preserve national unity during the industrial
troubles of the 1920s and the abdication. But so long as the charges on rearma-
ment and the ‘progressive ’ consensus against interwar domestic policies re-
mained strong, this line of defence had little purchase. In 1944 Bryant declined to
consider an enlarged edition of his 1937 ‘ tribute ’ : people were ‘ too prejudiced ’.85
As shown by Baldwin’s ﬁrst, and for many years only, academic defender,
an unusually unorthodox mind was needed to dissent publicly from the main
charges against Baldwin. Bassett had been one of those scarce 1930s ﬁgures, a
MacDonaldite, and after 1945 was still rarer in continuing to admire the National
government, about which he published two important historical books during the
1950s. As a politics tutor at the London School of Economics he was appalled by
what he regarded as the falsiﬁcation and suppression of facts to suit prejudices
about the interwar years, especially the obliteration of MacDonald’s contribution
to the Labour party by his senior colleague, Laski. He also thought it ‘wicked’
that students were being ‘misdirected’ by lecturers and writers who misquoted
Baldwin’s November 1936 passages.86 Although his 1948 article was aimed
principally at fellow political scientists it also treated ‘Baldwin’s confession’ as a
‘ legend’ with ‘ immense political inﬂuence’, and included among its targets both
Guilty men and The gathering storm. So entrenched had the distortions become that
Bassett’s method of exposure was to apply to a twelve-year-old public document
the sort of close textual analysis normally applied to centuries-old manuscripts.
Yet even here lack of access to the archives, compounded by Baldwin’s original
clumsiness, only shifted the ground of misunderstanding. Although Bassett
84 HCD 445, cc. 1466–74 (15 Dec. 1947) ; HLD 153, cc. 317–27 (17 Dec. 1947) ; Daily Telegraph, Times
leader, and Templewood (Samuel Hoare) inManchester Guardian, 15 Dec. 1947. The tone of most media
obituaries was critical. One of the more remarkable was that of British Movietone ﬁlm news; the same
footage and reporter used while praising Baldwin in the 1930s were now reused with a denigratory
commentary: see J. Ramsden, Stanley Baldwin (InterUniversity History Film Consortium, 1980), item 13.
85 Bryant to Davidson, 14 Nov. 1944, Davidson papers 293.
86 Note of Bassett interview, 6 June 1950, W. Baldwin papers ; R. Bassett, Democracy and foreign policy
(London, 1952), and idem, Nineteen thirty-one (London, 1958).
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rebutted the charge of deception in 1935, he missed Baldwin’s hypothetical,
counter-factual, argument and mistakenly supposed that decisions had been
taken in 1933–4 to postpone both rearmament and a general election.87 The
article had one immediate convert in Hoare, Baldwin’s foreign secretary in 1935,
who employed Bassett as a researcher on rearmament policies for his memoirs.
Bassett’s participation helped to make them the most cogent self-defence by a
National government minister88 – though like the memoirs of other Conservative
ministers, they retrospectively established some personal distance from Baldwin
himself. Copies of Bassett’s article were circulated by Baldwin’s friends, but
otherwise it was either ignored or absorbed into the larger charge of delayed
rearmament.
Why did Baldwin himself not reply to his critics ? Why, after his death, did
those best placed to provide a defence not only concede the points of censure, but
supply further material for the detractors?
Baldwin was certainly hurt and depressed by the collapse in his reputation. He
assumed that the Astley gates incident and obstructions to his second son’s mili-
tary promotion were vindictive, and he was dismayed by ugly stories about
himself : ‘ innumerable people believe that I went to America [in 1939] to hide ! ’.
But he tried to be philosophical, shrugging oﬀ the enmity of the Beaverbrook
press as inevitable and the abusive letters as understandable in the circumstances.
He also took the sensible and dutiful view that any public statement by himself
would only provoke further viliﬁcation and that he should not exacerbate
controversy during wartime, the more so because he admired Churchill’s
leadership.89 There were, however, prior reasons for his reticence.
Even before the war Baldwin stated that he would write ‘no memoirs or non-
sense of that kind’.90 His reasons were in part personal scrupulousness and public
principle. He thought it ‘a pitiful thing when men tried to justify their actions and
speeches after retirement ’, and he ‘did not wish to write things which would
inevitably cause grief and pain’ to others.91 Abstention from public comment
about former colleagues was included in a pledge he made on his retirement, to
withdraw altogether from party and ministerial politics.92 He was also sensitive to
87 Bassett, ‘Telling the truth’, esp. pp. 84, 87–8, 95, and for seeing oﬀ Beloﬀ over rearmament as a
1935 election issue, Cambridge Journal, 2 (1948–9), pp. 237–42.
88 Templewood to Bassett, 29 Dec. 1948, and letters and notes 1949, 1952–3, Cambridge University
Library (CUL), Templewood papers, XVII/4 (30), XIX/10; Lord Templewood, Nine troubled years
(London, 1954), p. 8.
89 T. Jones, A diary with letters, 1931–1950 (Oxford, 1954), pp. 482, 491–2, 515 ; Baldwin reported in
Mrs Burges memo., 24 Apr. 1940, W. Baldwin papers, and in P. Howard, Beaverbrook (London, 1964),
p. 77 ; Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 1058; Baldwin to Davidson, 27 Feb. 1943, Davidson papers,
289. Churchill independently heard concerns about Windham Baldwin’s position, and made
enquiries : Colville to Greig, 18 Jan. 1944, Churchill papers, CHAR 20/139A.
90 Baldwin to Robertson Scott, 4 Jan. 1938, CUL MS Add. 8770.
91 Burges memo., 24 Apr. 1940, and Peter Howard memo., 30 Aug. 1941, W. Baldwin papers.
92 Cabinet 22(37), 26 May 1937; Baldwin to Pick, 2 May 1940, in H. Montgomery Hyde, Baldwin
(London, 1973), p. 550.
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the claims of oﬃcial secrecy. He had experienced the diﬃculties created by
ministerial memoirs while overseeing the vetting of Lloyd George’s War memoirs,
when some of the oﬃcial papers cleared for publication had aroused grievances.
This had contributed to a tightening of the 1934 rules on public use of
cabinet documents, which Cabinet Oﬃce oﬃcials interpreted as prohibiting
any published reference to cabinet proceedings.93 Nor would Baldwin at ﬁrst
encourage any biographer. His family associations with popular biographical
subjects – William Morris, and his own cousin, Rudyard Kipling – had alerted
him to the frequent gulf between subject and biography, and given him a distrust
of all biographers. He shared Kipling’s distaste for writers who ‘coined [money]
out of Lives while the subjects are still alive ’ or sought to lay bare ‘all the life and
intimacies of men as soon as they are dead’, and adopted his scathing description
of these practices as ‘The Higher Cannibalism’.94 Both particularly disliked
biographers’ use of ‘psychological methods ’, making what Baldwin regarded as
improper connections between ‘a man and his work’ to produce ‘caricature ’.
He would not have Lytton Strachey’s books in his house.95
Another reason for Baldwin’s reticence was a detached perspective towards his
own career. He understood that proximity and hindsight distorted judgement,
while the lapse of time brought a truer assessment – an intelligent grasp of
the superiority of historical knowledge, ﬁrst learned from Montagu Butler at
Harrow.96 He believed that ‘no man can write the truth about himself ’, and
observed of Lloyd George’s memoirs that a participant in past events found it
diﬃcult to avoid writing ‘ in the light of what has happened since ’. Congratulating
Asquith’s widow on the imminent oﬃcial biography of her husband, he spoilt the
sentiment by observing that ‘ it is so diﬃcult to tell the truth – or even to dig it
out – within a generation’.97 In the late 1920s he failed to soothe Churchill, always
yearning for instant fame, with the view that ‘one can’t expect to see the result of
one’s own work’ ; and in 1940 he aﬀronted rather than consoled a dying
Chamberlain with the observation that ‘whether our work has been good or not
will not appear until long after we have passed away, and no worrying on our part
will aﬀect the verdict ’.98 He had long declared that ‘only history’ could properly
93 J. F. Naylor, A man and an institution : Sir Maurice Hankey, the cabinet secretariat, and the custody of cabinet
secrecy (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 206–7, 214–16, 223–4, 233–4.
94 Jones to Lady Grigg, 30 Apr. 1936, in Jones’s ‘diary’, National Library of Wales, Thomas Jones
papers ; Jones, Diary with letters, p. 207 ; Baldwin to Monica Baldwin, 10 Aug. 1941, Baldwin additional
papers.
95 Baldwin reported in H. Pearson and H. Kingsmill, Talking of Dick Whittington (London, 1947),
p. 189; Jones, Diary with letters, pp. 524, 538.
96 Burges memo., 24 Apr. 1940. Baldwin was also, of course, a Cambridge history graduate. For
Butler’s otherwise unfortunate involvement in his early life, see Baldwin, My father, pp. 44–7.
97 Baldwin to Salisbury, 1 July 1943, Hatﬁeld House archives, 4M/188/1; Jones, Diary with letters,
p. 105; Baldwin to Lady Oxford, 2 Oct. 1932, Bodleian Library, Margot Asquith papers, MS Eng.
c.6669/106.
98 Baldwin to Irwin, 8 Sept. 1933, Borthwick Institute, York, Halifax papers, A4.410.14.4; and to
N. Chamberlain, 13 Oct. 1940, NC 13/18/783.
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judge the work of himself and other politicians, because the current generation
lacked both adequate information about their actions and knowledge of the after-
eﬀects. As he retired he commented that ‘only 50 years hence could the real value
of his or any Premiership be judged’.99
Baldwin’s willingness to leave his public career to the verdict of ‘history’ and
his distaste for investigations into private lives not only did early disservice to his
reputation. It also caused diﬃculties for later historians, working with an access to
political records and with expectations about personal evidence far beyond those
he could have foreseen. Although he knew from publication during the 1920s and
1930s of political diaries, biographies, and memoirs (including Churchill’s Great
War volumes) that some ministers and oﬃcials collected documents in order to
present their own version of events, he himself never wrote diaries, nor did he
modify his habit of conducting political business verbally so as to have letters or
memoranda for the record. The letters and papers he received were preserved
by his secretaries and family, not kept by himself for later use. Consequently,
historians have been denied the access to Baldwin’s private thoughts that they
have for those of Churchill, the Chamberlains, Amery, and other contemporaries.
Baldwin also unwittingly complicated later judgements by not being entirely
consistent to his best intuitions. The adamantine self-certainty which Neville
Chamberlain maintained even after May 1940 was temperamentally alien to
him,100 and he was not so immune to hindsight that he did ask himself and discuss
with others whether he might have acted diﬀerently in the mid-1930s. From such
self-questionings some of Baldwin’s interlocutors gained an impression of an
uneasy conscience, particularly when – as with Churchill and G. M. Young – they
were unsympathetic on the sensitive issues, causing him either from politeness to
concede more than he meant, or to retreat into taciturnity.101
Yet as Baldwin’s discussions with more sympathetic individuals show, although
he occasionally thought he might have been more active on foreign policy, on
rearmament ‘his conscience [was] clear ’. Through all the criticism he remained
conﬁdent that ‘ in years to come unbiased historians would say he could not have
done more than he did’.102 His own assessment of his career rested on the themes
taken up by Bryant and several obituarists : social reconciliation, educating
Labour in parliamentary methods, and establishing the Conservatives as a
national party.103 Here a September 1939 letter from the Labour MP, David
Kirkwood, became a comfort (he had copies made for friends), as a statement
99 Winterton diary, 4 May 1937; and see S. Baldwin, Our inheritance (London, 1928), pp. 248–9,
307–8; Burges memo., 24 Apr. 1940; Baldwin, My father, p. 11.
100 Jones, Diary with letters, p. 482, records Baldwin’s unease with the attitude revealed by
Chamberlain to Baldwin, 17 Oct. 1940, in Feiling, Chamberlain, pp. 455–6.
101 Gilbert, Churchill, VII, p. 1349, and below for Young.
102 Baldwin, My father, p. 317; Hinchingbrooke journal, 9 Feb. 1938, in A. Best and J. Sandwich,
Hinch (Mapperton, 1997), p. 54 ; Burges memo., 24 Apr. 1940; Howard, Beaverbrook, p. 77.
103 E.g. ‘Mr Baldwin’s testament’, 28 Apr. 1937, Crathorne papers, courtesy of Lord Crathorne;
Baldwin, My father, pp. 327–8; Hyde, Baldwin, p. 550.
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by a radical ‘Clydeside ’ socialist of the 1920s that the national co-operation
in war mobilization owed much to his eﬀorts for industrial peace.104 Baldwin
knew his ‘appalling frankness ’ and ‘unsealed lips ’ passages had been
misjudgements – ‘ stupid ’ and ‘ foolish’ – but he was still puzzled by the mis-
understandings, where these were not obviously malevolent. His defence was
consciously historical in form, stressing the need to understand conditions in
1933–5: ‘ the critics have no historical sense ’. After so long accusing him of weak
leadership they now assumed that he had been a dictator, responsible for every-
thing that had happened. Information on German rearmament had been unre-
liable, Hitler still seemed to want agreements, and his later actions could not have
been foreseen, any more than the fall of France had been. Given the strength of
peace feeling and illusions about collective security, precipitate large-scale
rearmament on apparently ‘ﬂimsy’ grounds would have split the country and
jeopardized the re-election of the only party grouping committed to national
defence; instead he had presented rearmament carefully and successfully, and in
1935 won a majority for general rearmament.105
It was not Baldwin himself but his private secretary, Geoﬀrey Fry, and his
closest advisers, Tom Jones and J. C. C. Davidson, who were most concerned to
arrange a defence of his reputation. Baldwin remained reluctant : ﬁrst mentioned
in September 1940, it was late 1942 before he would entertain the idea, perhaps
inﬂuenced by the experience of talking with Feiling about Neville Chamberlain’s
biography. Even so it took a further two years of ‘explanation & persuasion’
before he agreed to commission a book, and then on condition that it would be
published after his death.106
An obvious author might have been Jones himself, as a cabinet secretary
during the 1920s, Baldwin’s principal speech writer, and as a diarist the nearest
he had to a Boswell. To Jones’s own later regret, however, he chose instead to
write a life of Lloyd George.107 Nevertheless, Jones made a large contribution
to verdicts on Baldwin, as the anonymous author of his most substantial
obituary notice, prepared for The Times. Commissioned in December 1934 and
submitted three years later, it was written with the knowledge of Baldwin who,
knowing an obituary was inescapable and trusting Jones as he would no ordinary
104 Kirkwood to Baldwin, 18 Sept. 1939, in Young, Baldwin, pp. 94–6, and copies in Davidson
papers, 262, and Jones papers, A6/41; Baldwin to Bryant, 14 Dec. 1940, 2 Jan. 1941, Bryant papers,
C/62.
105 Burges memo., 24 Apr. 1940; Jones, Diary with letters, pp. 447, 482–3, 491 ; Best and Sandwich,
Hinch, p. 54; R. A. Butler, The art of the possible (London, 1971), p. 88; Baldwin to Davidson, 27 Feb.
1943, Davidson papers, 289. For the problems with information on German rearmament, see
W. K. Wark, The ultimate enemy: British intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939 (London, 1985).
106 Jones, Diary with letters, pp. 470, 527 ; Jones to Flexner, 3 Dec. 1942, 20 Dec. 1947, Jones papers,
S3/18, 86. Baldwin had Feiling to visit at Astley in September 1942, persuaded by Horace Wilson’s
plea for assistance and the knowledge that Feiling was a professional historian: Baldwin to Wilson,
Aug. 1941, copy in NC 11/15/133. Fry had contemplated a future biography even before Baldwin
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biographer, helped with information on his early life and answered Jones’s
questions on political incidents.108 It is indicative of the decline in Baldwin’s
reputation by 1947 that The Times printed only a shortened version, although
there remained suﬃcient interest for it to publish the full text as a separate
pamphlet.109
Jones’s memoir drew on his own familiarity with Baldwin, the knowledge of
several of his secretaries and oﬃcials, and an intelligent understanding of interwar
government. It remains among the best, and generally most sympathetic, of the
short Baldwin biographies. But it added two elements to the critical interpret-
ation. The ﬁrst was indirect and peculiarly contingent. As the ‘real explanation’
for Baldwin’s decision for the 1923 protectionist election, Jones quoted from his
note of a Baldwin recollection in September 1935. Speaking while exercised by
the electoral challenge of Lloyd George’s Council of Action, Baldwin said that
twelve years earlier one of his purposes had similarly been to pre-empt Lloyd
George. Jones’s account probably became the source for the same claim made in
The gathering storm,110 and it certainly struck a chord with another of Baldwin’s
former colleagues. Amery had resented Baldwin’s resistance to his own imperial
economic proposals, and had a general impression that in his political style
Baldwin sought to be ‘as unlike Lloyd George as possible ’. When writing his
autobiography in 1951 he reread Jones’s 1947 memoir and obtained and published
a copy of his full 1935 note, which crystallized a new and larger idea. Amery now
concluded that for Baldwin ‘ the one dominant motive all through … was fear of
Lloyd George and his inﬂuence ’, and that this was the main explanation not only
for the 1923 decision but also for two further, emblematic, actions : his appoint-
ment of Churchill to the Treasury in 1924 (to separate him from Lloyd George)
and his agreement to form the 1931 National government (to exclude both Lloyd
George and Churchill from oﬃce).111 In turn Jones, always interested in Lloyd
George’s inﬂuence, himself adopted Amery’s view in his 1951 Lloyd George
biography, and then in the edition of his own diaries and his Dictionary of national
biography article on Baldwin, both prepared in 1953–4. He did so even though it
meant overlooking a fuller explanation of the 1923 decision that Baldwin had sent
him in 1940, in which Lloyd George was not a signiﬁcant consideration.112
A dubious ‘recollection ’ and a jaundiced impression had been conﬂated by
supposedly authoritative writers to construct what in later historical accounts
108 Material in Jones papers, A7; and see Jones, Diary with letters, pp. 154–5, 160, 207.
109 Times, 15 Dec. 1947, and The Times [T. Jones], Lord Baldwin : a memoir (London, 1947).
110 Lord Baldwin, p. 8; Churchill, Gathering storm, p. 18 (1949 edn, p. 20). In 1923 Churchill had still
been a Liberal, with no knowledge of Conservative leadership calculations.
111 Amery to Jones, 12, 16 Nov. 1951, Jones papers, AA1/14, A7/60; L. S. Amery, My political life
(3 vols., London, 1953–5), II, pp. 280–1, 299, 479, 511, III, p. 397, and see Amery diaries, II, p. 195n.
112 T. Jones, Lloyd George (Oxford, 1951), pp. 207–8; Jones, Diary with letters, p. xxxii ; Dictionary of
national biography, 1941–1950 (Oxford, 1959), pp. 44–5; cf. Baldwin to Jones, 25 Nov. 1940, Jones
papers A6/2. Jones might also have reﬂected on his own knowledge that Baldwin seriously considered
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B A L DW I N’S R E P U T A T I O N 151
became – despite its inherent implausibility – a general interpretation, almost a
‘ fact ’, which reinforced the view of Baldwin as inadequately focused upon the
crucial national issues : that a principal aim of his whole career was to exclude
Lloyd George from power.113
The second legacy of the memoir was more direct. Although Baldwin
and Jones shared some social and moral sympathies, in other respects their
perspectives were diﬀerent, in ways which Jones did not always fathom. As a
radical, Labour-voting admirer of Lloyd George and an administrative ‘man of
business ’ – and one whose readiness with policy suggestions was not always ap-
propriate to his position and knowledge – Jones considered Baldwin the cautious
Conservative, anti-statist, politician to be ‘ impervious to detail ’, having ‘only
the sketchiest acquaintance’ with much cabinet business, and reluctant to take
decisions. Although Jones qualiﬁed these statements and suggested balancing
strengths, his account did much to elevate a common impression of an aspect
of Baldwin’s style into a determining aspect of his leadership and government
policy : he was liable to ‘bovine indolence ’, and ‘posterity will have hard things to
say of his inertia ’.114 Particular instances of these traits were also implied. In
1935–6 Jones had been an early and enthusiastic appeaser, visiting Germany to
meet Nazi leaders and trying to arrange a meeting between Baldwin and Hitler.
His eﬀorts came to nothing because Baldwin, not trusting the Germans ‘an inch’,
eventually preferred the judgement of his foreign secretary, Eden – who dep-
recated the proposal as a German tactic to weaken Anglo-French re-
lations – rather than the urgings of someone, even a friend, with no foreign policy
experience. For Jones this was a missed opportunity which he increasingly re-
gretted as Anglo-German relations deteriorated, until by early 1938 he hated
Eden and thought that ‘a heavy load of guilt lies on S.B. ’. In his memoir Baldwin
was presented not just as ‘ ill at ease ’ and lacking interest in foreign aﬀairs, but
even as distrusting and disliking ‘ foreigners ’ – notwithstanding the evidence of
their many conversations on foreign issues in his own diaries, and his knowledge
of Baldwin’s foreign trips and friendships.115 On the main accusation, Jones in
mitigation argued that Baldwin had decided ‘ to educate the country ’ in the need
for rearmament. But he forgot that in a June 1935 article he had described
Baldwin in November 1934 bringing ‘public and paciﬁc opinion to accept the
drastic positive measures for aircraft production … now in operation’. Writing
with the perspectives of 1937 and after Baldwin’s ‘appalling frankness ’ passages,
Jones now described the rearmament preparations as beginning only after
113 For reassessment of Baldwin’s 1923 decision, see esp. M. Cowling, The impact of Labour
(Cambridge, 1971), chs. 15–16; for comment on the larger claims, see Williamson, Baldwin, pp. 10–11,
228–31, 235.
114 Lord Baldwin, pp. 20, 22. For the Baldwin–Jones relationship, see Williamson, Baldwin, pp. 66, 72,
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115 Jones, Diary with letters, pp. 175–6, 180–1, 193–4, 207–8, 239–65; E. L. Ellis, ‘T.J. ’ : a life of
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June 1935, and accepted the now conventional view that Baldwin had been
‘slow to act ’.116
These themes were absorbed most readily by the recipient of Baldwin’s
commission, chosen on Fry’s and Jones’s recommendation. As an historian, man
of letters, public servant, and Conservative political commentator, G. M. Young
seemed a good choice. Baldwin had been acquainted with him since the mid-
1930s, occasionally seeking his advice on literary matters. As respectively
president and chairman of the British Association for International Understand-
ing they had corresponded during the early war years, and Young had been
an occasional guest at Astley Hall. Baldwin admired Young’s writings, and
considered him well qualiﬁed to produce the only kind of book he would con-
template about himself – not a personal biography but a life explained by his
times, or as Young had written of Victorian England, a Portrait of an age. ‘No one’,
Baldwin wrote, ‘could [better] picture the mentality of that strange post war era
in England from 1918 to the out-break of the present war. ’117
Young worked with considerable advantages. He could talk with Baldwin
about his career, spending around thirty days at Astley for the purpose,
and Baldwin’s political papers were made available to him at his Wiltshire
home by Fry, a close neighbour. As Baldwin had authorized the book, his
family, friends, and former associates answered questions or lent documents.118
During 1945 Young was shown material in the Royal Archives, and the king
and his secretaries commented helpfully on his draft abdication chapter.
Although not suspected by readers when his book was published nor later by
historians once the same records became publicly available, he was also
granted a privilege denied to Feiling three years earlier. By special dispensation
which Baldwin obtained personally from Churchill, Young was the ﬁrst person
other than ministers and oﬃcials to read the interwar cabinet records – stretching
a provision under the 1934 Cabinet Oﬃce rules which coincided with the
reason for Baldwin’s changed attitude towards oﬃcial secrecy : access to oﬃcial
documents ‘might … be given for the purpose of vindicating the memory of
a deceased Cabinet minister ’, where that memory had been ‘ injured’.119 Young
had at his disposal a range and quantity of sources not available to other
116 Lord Baldwin, pp. 3, 17, 22 ; compare ‘P.Q.R.’ [ Jones], ‘Mr Baldwin’, Spectator, 7 June 1935,
authorship established by Jones’s unpublished ‘diary’, 6 June 1935.
117 Baldwin to Jones, 23 Dec. 1944, in Jones, Diary with letters, p. 527; G. M. Young, Victorian England:
portrait of an age (Oxford, 1936).
118 To those listed in Young, Baldwin, p. 13, can be added Baldwin’s sons and daughters, Halifax,
Templewood, Duﬀ Cooper, Reith, Lady Davidson, Mann of the Yorkshire Post, Barrington-Ward of The
Times, and Baldwin’s parliamentary private secretaries, Rhys and Hinchingbrooke.
119 Public Record Oﬃce (PRO) CAB 21/4476, July 1945 material, and Brook note, 20 Aug. 1945;
1934 rules in PRO PREM 1/171. Baldwin had not used draft letters by Davidson and Jones, cited
respectively in Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 1063, and Naylor, A man and an institution, p. 235
(which, published before relevant PRO ﬁles were released, understandably but mistakenly assumed
that Young did not see cabinet material). For Feiling see Bridges to Howarth, 7 Oct. 1941, CAB 21/
2166. Churchill was not, therefore, the ﬁrst to have access to public records, as is commonly assumed;
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biographers and historians for another twenty years, and in some cases much
longer.120
Even so, by 1948 Young despaired of writing anything adequate. He became
disillusioned with Baldwin himself and suﬀered some form of nervous breakdown
over the book, twice oﬀering to abandon it and ﬁnishing it in 1952 only with the
persuasion and assistance of his publisher, Hart-Davis.121 Even during the ﬁnal
production stages there were diﬃculties and postponements, which reveal further
constraints on interpretation of interwar politics in the 1950s. Although the book
is now noted for its criticism of Baldwin, before publication the greater concern
was its criticism of other ﬁgures, still alive and powerful. These included ministers
in the 1951 Conservative government, who considered it appropriate to use civil
servants to protect their historical reputations.
Young’s proofs survived scrutiny by the Cabinet Oﬃce (a condition of his
access to its records) with only slight changes to remove direct references to
cabinet papers and named oﬃcials, and by libel lawyers (the publisher’s pre-
caution) with dilution of a few comments on individuals, notably the duke and
duchess of Windsor. But these processes placed copies of the text in other hands.
Eden, always worried that his ﬁrst period as foreign secretary in 1935–8 might
tarnish his subsequent reputation as an ‘anti-appeaser ’, was ‘profoundly dis-
turbed’ by Young’s account of the 1936 Rhineland crisis, which suggested that the
British government had restrained the French from taking military action against
Germany. After mediation by a fellow cabinet minister, J. P. L. Thomas, only
resulted in Young proposing what Eden regarded as insuﬃcient changes, he
turned for heavier pressure to his permanent secretary, declaring that the issue
aﬀected not just his own reputation but also those of Baldwin and ‘ the Cabinet
and our Party and the country ’. Although cabinet oﬃcials still thought Young’s
account a ‘ fair summary of the Cabinet minutes ’, the Foreign Oﬃce appeal to
national interests persuaded Brook, the cabinet secretary, to prevail on Hart-
Davis to impose further amendments. Consequently several sentences in chapter
22 are not Young’s but those of the Foreign Oﬃce librarian, who invoked
the authority of The gathering storm against the cabinet records : such was the con-
temporary ascendancy of Churchill’s published opinion over even the best
indeed in 1946 he used his prime-ministerial dispensation to Baldwin and Young as a precedent when
asking Attlee to allow access to oﬃcial papers for his own researchers: Gilbert, Churchill, VII, p. 235.
120 For instance, Young read cabinet records on the abdication crisis not released in the PRO until
2003. He was also responsible for the unique record of the cabinet discussion on Hoare’s 1935 resig-
nation being unsealed (though it is uncertain whether he was allowed to read the contents) : Brook
note, 19 June 1946, CAB 21/4476, explaining the incident recounted in Naylor, A man and an institution,
p. 253. Young spent many weeks from September 1945 to June 1946 reading papers in a Cabinet Oﬃce
room, for which he was given his own key.
121 Many of these and following details are in the G. M. Young ﬁle in McFarlin Library, University
of Tulsa, Hart-Davis papers, hereafter, unless otherwise stated, the source for Hart-Davis correspon-
dence. But see also Hart-Davis letters in CUL MS Add. 7799, and R. Hart-Davis, Halfway to heaven
(Stroud, 1998), p. 38.
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documentary evidence.122 Another copy of Young’s proofs reached Beaverbrook,
who was advised by his lawyer and by Robert Blake, the Oxford historian
he had commissioned to write the biography of Bonar Law, that the book
contained defamatory statements about himself and Churchill. The main
complaint was over Baldwin’s claimed view that in the early 1920s they, together
with Lloyd George and Birkenhead, had been bent on enjoying power for its
own sake, were ‘degrading public life ’, and wanted a war against Turkey for
the purpose of relieving unemployment. After setting libel lawyers on to Young
and Hart-Davis, Beaverbrook sent the proofs to Churchill, who found ad-
ditional causes for complaint. An embarrassed Brook – who, on a matter not
aﬀecting policy, was now careful to say he was only acting privately, not as
the cabinet secretary – was instructed to inform the publishers that Churchill
considered the book to contain untrue and ‘ ill-natured comments and charges ’
against himself. The combination of legal threat and prime ministerial dis-
pleasure brought rapid compliance and agreement on yet more changes, nego-
tiated with the lawyers.123 These now involved much work, expense, and delay
because the whole ﬁrst edition had been printed and stitched: seven pages had
to be cut from 7,800 copies, and the revised and reprinted pages glued back
by hand.124
Why, though, had Young found it hard to write the book at all, and how did an
authorized defence of Baldwin produce yet more accusations against him? Young
blamed much of his diﬃculty on the nature of Baldwin’s papers ; they contained,
he wrote, so few personal letters and notes as to be ‘utterly worthless ’ for any
biography better than a version of the ‘Annual Register ’. He even made this into
a grievance against Baldwin’s sons, imagining they had destroyed and delayed
delivery of important papers, and demanding an increased share of the royalties
as ﬁnancial compensation.125 All researchers on interwar British politics will
sympathize with Young’s frustration at the scarcity of Baldwin’s political letters
and his insubstantial presence even in cabinet minutes ; but it is surprising that he
found so little inspiration in the now 233 volumes of Baldwin’s political papers,
122 PRO FO 370/2297 and CAB 21/4476, material for July–Aug. 1952, esp. undated Eden memo.,
Brook note, 7 Aug., and Passant note, 9 Aug. For Eden’s obsessive surveillance over his own repu-
tation, see D. Dutton, Anthony Eden (London, 1997), pp. 1–16.
123 For Beaverbrook (who also involved Birkenhead’s family), see Blake memo., 22 Sept. 1952, and
legal papers Sept.–Oct. 1952 in House of Lords Record Oﬃce, Beaverbrook papers, C/43, H/152,
H/406. For Churchill, Sept.–Oct. 1952 exchanges in PREM 11/239 and CAB 21/4476.
124 Hart-Davis to Young, 8 Oct., 12 Nov. 1952; and Hart-Davis list, Nov. 1952, in CUL MS Add.
7938. The pages replaced in the book’s ﬁrst impression were pp. 30, 31, 39, 116, 161, 227, 240.
125 Young to Murray, 26 Jan. 1948, Bodleian Library, MS Gilbert Murray, 99/8–9; and to Hart-
Davis, 19 June 1949, 22 Feb. 1950, 20 June 1951 ; Young, Baldwin, p. 11. He supposed that Oliver
Baldwin burned a ‘ large’ collection of papers at Astley, when (as Fry could have told him) the political
ﬁles never went there. The destroyed material consisted of some, though not all, post-1940 personal
and abusive letters (a number have survived). Windham Baldwin delivered three boxes in 1951 which
Young (as he conceded after publication) had been oﬀered in 1948, but then forgotten: W. Baldwin,
Watt and Pinsent exchanges, Dec. 1952–Jan. 1953, CUL MS Add. 7938.
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and thought the cabinet records ‘very bleak and not of much value’.126 The real
problems lay not with the sources, but with Young himself. He was not, like
Feiling, a research historian familiar with political records, indeed he was con-
temptuous of what he called ‘ the machine-turned researcher ’.127 He was an
essayist, an impressionist whose favourite devices were allusion, anecdote, classi-
cal tropes, and literary quotations.128 As Kitson Clark noted, Young’s Portrait of an
age had been less ‘history’ than precisely a ‘portrait ’, containing ‘ that selection
of facts which commended itself to the vision of the artist ’, considered from a
self-consciously personal perspective.129 He had a poor understanding of how to
handle original sources, pursue and assess evidence, and preserve accuracy. He
wrote on documents, mislaid or forgot to return them to owners, and incorpor-
ated those from which he wanted to quote in his manuscript, defaced with his own
text or typing instructions.130 For all his complaints about inadequate sources, he
did not interview or ask for documents from some obvious ﬁgures – Churchill,
Eden, Amery, the widows of Bridgeman and the Chamberlains, Tom Jones
and Baldwin’s cabinet secretary, Hankey. When Young did contact Baldwin’s
associates, rather than encouraging independent testimonies he tended to state
his own views and to seek conﬁrmation for them with leading questions.131 As he
worked he trusted to his normally prodigious memory, despite being aware that
it was liable to make slips and to elaborate the evidence : he even gave this trait a
playful name (‘ the Imp’) and wrote an essay about it. The result was similar to
that found by Kitson Clark in the Portrait of an age : almost every quotation and
even some basic factual details in the Baldwin book were inaccurate, where not
corrected at the last moment by Hart-Davis.132
The larger reasons for Young’s diﬃculties were his assumptions, his questions,
and the kind of book he chose to write. He tried to be balanced, and stressed some
positive features. He admired Baldwin’s love of classics, his political oratory
(hiding his dismay at discovering that he used speech writers), his resistance to the
‘press lords ’, and his stand against Churchill on India. More than any previous
account, he developed the case for Baldwin as a great domestic prime minister,
whose constitutionalism and sympathy towards the Labour movement ‘saved
126 Bridges note, 27 Feb. 1946, and Brook note, 28 Jan. 1948, CAB 21/4476.
127 Young to Bryant, 16 Jan. 1937, Bryant papers, E/3.
128 See Young’s collected essays, Daylight and champaign (London, 1937) ; Today and yesterday (London,
1948) ; and Last essays (London, 1950). Hart-Davis noted that Young’s previous publications had ‘come
largely out of his head’, but the Baldwin book demanded ‘a lot of work’ which he ‘wouldn’t or
couldn’t do’ : The Lyttleton Hart-Davis letters, I : 1955–1956, ed. R. Hart-Davis (London, 1978), p. 132.
129 G. Kitson Clark, ed., G. M. Young : portrait of an age : annotated edition (London, 1977), pp. 10–11.
130 E.g. Baldwin papers, 1/80a–c, 167/187–90, and complaints about non-return of documents in
W. Baldwin papers. Windham Baldwin recovered further documents from Young’s executors after his
death in 1959.
131 See esp. Young to Citrine, 20, 23 June 1948, British Library of Political and Economic Science,
Citrine papers, 10/1.
132 Young, Today and yesterday, pp. 194–7; Lyttleton Hart-Davis letters, I, p. 133, and Young/Hart-Davis
papers, early 1952; Kitson Clark, Portrait of an age, p. 13.
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Parliamentary Government ’ and helped create the national unity of 1939–40.133
But these were not his principal concern. He settled his main line of interpretation
early, in 1946, and thereafter regarded much in Baldwin’s career as clutter,
complaining that his theme ‘got clogged with rubbish about miners ’ wages, and
Beaverbrook, and the crisis of 1931, and the Red Letter ’.134 Despite the richness of
his sources, Young was unable to detach himself from the dominant view about
Baldwin. He took it for granted that his main problem, and the focus for the
whole book, was to explain why Baldwin ‘was slow to take up Germany’s chal-
lenge to start rearmament ’.135 He soon concluded that the conventional charge
was right : Baldwin had ‘concealed the truth to win an election’ ; as Bevin had
said, he ‘ lied ’.136 He was therefore predisposed towards the verdict of The gathering
storm (which, like most contemporaries, he considered an ‘ immortal ’ book) ; in-
deed, he printed Churchill’s severest sentences and the notorious index entry
(‘party before country ’) at the start of his own book. He accepted the usual
mutilated version of Baldwin’s November 1936 passages, and was so ﬁxed in his
assumptions that he dismissed Bassett’s article as ‘of no importance ’.137
As Young’s correspondence demonstrates, his focus on rearmament deter-
mined what evidence he wanted to ﬁnd. When it could not be found in the places
he expected, he developed further ﬁxed ideas, which in turn determined which
type of material he would use and which he would ignore. On discovering that
Baldwin’s papers and the cabinet minutes had little on his personal views, Young
did not ask to see the cabinet committee and imperial defence papers, which
contained the real evidence about rearmament. Nor did he examine Baldwin’s
speeches in detail, even though the main charge turned on his public statements.
Nor did it occur to him that he might have misconceived the problem, and should
ask diﬀerent questions. Instead, he decided that a conventional biography was
impossible, and that he was left with two choices. The ﬁrst was the book which
Baldwin thought he had commissioned Young to write : ‘a political history of the
inter-war years with Baldwin as the main ﬁgure among a number of other
ﬁgures ’.138 The alternative, and the one he chose, was precisely what Baldwin had
dreaded. Young found that ‘ the psychology of the subject is so absorbing that the
history is moving further and further into the background’.139 He did not inform
Baldwin of his decision. In 1946 Baldwin still believed that Young shared his own
‘dislike for the modern psychological approach in biographies ’, and was writing
‘a history of the inter-war years ’ which might be an ‘ introduction ’ to a much
133 See esp. Young, Baldwin, pp. 12, 253–4. For speeches, Young to Jones, 12 Apr. 1948, 30 Oct. 1951,
Jones papers, A7/55, WW32/73.
134 Young to Jones, 30 Oct. 1951, ibid. 135 Bridges note, 22 Feb. 1946, CAB 21/4476.
136 Young to Duﬀ Cooper, 22 Sept. 1946, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, DUFC 2/1; to
Citrine, 20 June 1948, Citrine papers, 10/1; and to W. Baldwin, 21 Feb. 1950, CUL MS Add. 7938.
137 Young, Baldwin, pp. 11–12, 228–9; Fry to Jones, 22 Oct. 1952, Jones papers, AA1/19.
138 Bridges memo., 22 Feb. 1946, CAB 21/4476; Young, Baldwin, p. 11.
139 Young to Cooper, 22 Sept. 1946, DUFC 2/1; to W. Baldwin, 8 Aug. 1946, CUL MS Add. 7938.
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later biography.140 Nor did Young inform his readers. He stated why his
book was not a ‘ fully documented life ’, but omitted to specify the ‘diﬀerent form’
that it took. This created misunderstandings about its status and quality : as
an authorized book, it was assumed to be an authoritative record. Yet, like
Portrait of an age, it was, as Young himself privately wrote, ‘not history ’ : it was
a ‘psychological study ’, more than a ‘contribution to political history ’.141
Though more sophisticated than Guilty men and other wartime polemics, like
them it based explanation more on purported personality defects than political
analysis.
Balancing his admiration for some of Baldwin’s qualities with an assumption
of his shortcomings over rearmament, and characteristically resorting to a
classical model, Young chose a single overarching theme for the book, that of
Aristotelian tragedy: ‘ the good man with the weak spot which unﬁtted him
for the situation he had to face ’.142 Baldwin’s weakness, he decided, was that
‘popular sympathy had become a drug which he could not do without. And
it had been administered in quantities which must have made deprivation an
anguish. ’ Consequently he ‘could not say hard things, when hard things needed
to be said’ : it followed that Baldwin could not tell the full truth about Germany
and rearmament to the people.143 Consequently too, Young claimed that
Baldwin suﬀered great anguish over his unpopularity in 1940: ‘They hate me
so. ’144 Once these premises are understood, much that is otherwise puzzling
about Young’s work falls into place. Although Baldwin talked readily with
Jones about rearmament and the 1935 election, Young found him elusive on
these matters. Given Baldwin’s dislike of ‘psychology’, this is not surprising: he
would have been embarrassed by Young’s intrusive questions. Yet Young re-
garded that evasiveness as signiﬁcant : this convinced him that the ‘popular
verdict ’ was true, and he made much of it in his book. He deduced that for
Baldwin the 1935 election was a ‘sensitive spot ’, about which he had a ‘bad
conscience ’. From there he further deduced that Baldwin had ‘ lost his nerve ’
140 Pearson and Kingsmill, Whittington, p. 189; Baldwin to Oliver Baldwin, 3 June 1946, CUL MS
Add. 9569/7.
141 Young, Baldwin, p. 11 ; Young to Davidson, 27 Jan. 1946, Davidson papers 302; to W. Baldwin,
21, 24 Feb. 1950 (emphasis in original), CUL MS Add. 7938; to Hart-Davis, 22 Feb. 1950; Brook note,
30 Jan. 1948, CAB 21/4476.
142 Young to W. Baldwin, 23 June [1946], 23 May 1947, 21 Feb. 1950, CUL MS Add. 7938. The
theme is submerged in the book’s text, though see Young, Baldwin, p. 205.
143 E.g. Young to Cooper, 22 Sept. 1946, DUFC 2/1, and to Halifax, 8 Aug. 1947, Halifax papers,
A.2.278.96; G. M. Young, ‘Stanley Baldwin’, Sunday Times, 21 Dec. 1947, carried into Young, Baldwin,
p. 57.
144 Young, Baldwin, p. 250. The point was important to Young, as presumed conﬁrmation of his
thesis : see Young to W. Baldwin, 23 June [1946], CULMS Add. 7938. No independent evidence exists
of this well-known statement, nor of Young’s other claim that he was ‘advised, or warned’ not to visit
London. Baldwin’s letters state that he stayed away because he did not wish to bother friends pre-
occupied with the war crisis, and because of the problems of wartime travel. For Young’s probable
source, see n. 148 below.
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after the East Fulham by-election and could not bring himself to press for
adequate rearmament.145
The problems with all this are plain: the successive and self-reinforcing
suppositions, and the arguments from silence, both documentary and verbal.
Quite how Young decided that Baldwin craved popular aﬀection is unclear,
unless it followed from his initial assumption – that Baldwin had not been explicit
about rearmament from fear of public criticism. What is certain is that Young
had no documentary evidence. Such psychological speculations were not sus-
ceptible to written proof, and no contemporary Baldwin statement about East
Fulham has survived. This explains Young’s complaints about the deﬁciency of
the papers he had seen, his disinclination to pursue further sources, and what
close inspection reveals to be strikingly low standards of ‘evidence’. He wanted
testimonies about personal ‘character ’, not more documents about politics. His
despair about the book from 1948 came as he realized the diﬃculty of building
substance around his assumptions. As he told Hart-Davis, he would just have to
‘rely on my prose to carry oﬀ the truth that the subject has ceased to appeal
to me’.146
This prose included conjecture, insinuation (‘ it seemed to me’, ‘ I often
thought ’) and presentation of particular incidents as general traits (‘he would’),
all given apparent legitimacy through reported conversations and an implied
intimacy with Baldwin (‘we talked ’, ‘he told me’, ‘ I noticed’). His substance,
when detached from his premises, amounts to little more than impression and
hearsay.147 It came in two parts. The ﬁrst, on Baldwin’s supposed dependence on
public aﬀection, consisted of cumulative psychological innuendo. He was the only
child of an invalid mother, a lonely boy, a humiliated schoolboy, an unsuccessful
undergraduate, a disappointment to a domineering father, shy with women, and
between him and his wife (notwithstanding their seven children) ‘ there was not
much passion in their mating’ – a particularly unprovable, as well as tasteless,
assertion. Consequently, Young argued, Baldwin’s personality was not natural
but artiﬁcial, ‘built-up ’, the more so because as a surprise late-comer to leader-
ship he had to improvise a claim to authority. Also, because he found close
personal relationships diﬃcult and felt burdened by ‘the ultimate loneliness ’ of
the premiership, Baldwin found his happiness in large gatherings, in the House of
Commons and still more in public meetings, ‘giving and taking aﬀection without
personal intimacy and individual concern’. So he resolved to capture public
admiration by making himself representative of his largest audience. Although by
temperament and partial descent a ‘Celt ’, he ‘deliberately and by election’
145 Young to Davidson, 8 Mar. 1946, Davidson papers, 302; to Halifax, 8 Aug. 1947, Halifax papers,
A.2.278.96; to Jones, 18 Apr. 1948, Jones papers A7/57, and to W. Baldwin, 4 Apr. 1949, CUL MS
Add. 7938; Young, Baldwin, pp. 176–7, 200, 229–30. 146 Young to Hart-Davis, 25 Aug. 1948.
147 E.g. Fry–Jones exchanges, 10, 13 Oct. 1952, 1 Feb. 1953, Jones papers, AA1/17, W7/163, A7/62,
on the unlikeliness of the much-repeated story of Baldwin practising a pose before a mirror (Young,
Baldwin, pp. 56–7) – which actually derived from Rowse (End of the Epoch, p. 84), who maliciously
presented as ‘ fact ’ what had only been speculation in Salter, Security, p. 196.
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adopted the persona and ‘played the part ’ of an ‘Englishman’.148 A Baldwin
statement during the special circumstances of the abdication crisis – ‘my worst
enemy could never say that I do not understand the people of England’ – became
for Young a key not just to a supposed timidity over rearmament, but to his
whole career.149
The second set of arguments were those validated by Jones’s memoir and
Churchill’s Gathering storm. As his Aristotelian theme required Baldwin to be unﬁtted
to his situation, so Young made a great deal of his supposed ignorance and
aversion to foreign and defence matters, even (with no known evidence) creating
the still-current legend that when foreign aﬀairs came before the cabinet he
‘would close his eyes ’ and ask to be woken after the discussion had ﬁnished. This
failing arose, Young wrote, because ‘he could never bring his mind to bear on
anything that did not interest him’, a claim established by an insistence on
Baldwin’s ‘ indolence ’ : ‘his inertia, his laziness, his easy-going ways ’.150 Again
Young found personal conﬁrmation, making no allowances for a man in his late
seventies when observing Baldwin’s short attention span, nor for Baldwin’s diﬃ-
dence when in his well-known ﬁrst sentence he described Baldwin’s invitation to
write the book as oﬀered ‘somewhat languidly ’.151 From these alleged traits
followed assertions about Baldwin’s ‘neglect of much that a Prime Minister ought
not to neglect ’, his dislike of paperwork and decision making, and the time he
spent in the House of Commons, in order to avoid oﬃcials and colleagues.152
Young even elevated Baldwin’s temperament into general political narrative,
where the course of various episodes, particularly the aftermaths of the General
Strike and Hoare–Laval crisis, were determined by his supposed ﬂuctuation
between impulsive exertion and nervous relapse (an account formed partly from
analogy with Young’s own mood swings).153 As an example of negligence he
148 Young, Baldwin, pp. 18–23, 25, 52–7, 134–5. Hardly any letters between Baldwin and his wife
survive, and there is no sign that Young examined his parents’ papers. But the development of these
assertions can be traced from Young’s own letters. His principal source was Baldwin’s eldest son,
Oliver, even thoughWindham warned Young not to trust his testimony, given Oliver’s breach with his
own father, ignorance about his grandparents, and liking for amateur psychology. Young nevertheless
seized on Oliver’s stories: W. Baldwin–Young exchanges, 8, 10, 23 June 1946, W. Baldwin papers, and
CUL MS Add. 7938. Young himself was a bachelor with unusual domestic circumstances, see Lyttleton
Hart-Davis letters, I, pp. 132–3.
149 Young to W. Baldwin, 23 June 1946, CULMS Add. 7938, and to Cooper, 22 Sept. 1946, DUFC
2/1; Young, Baldwin, pp. 54, 129, and see pp. 225–6: the phrase was, typically, misquoted. The book’s
Homeric epigraph – ‘Now let everyone remember the kindliness of poor Patroclus, who knew how to
be gentle to all ’ – was calculatedly double-edged: in Young’s terms, Baldwin’s conciliation of the
Labour movement and his sensitivity towards peace opinion were two aspects of his desire to retain
public aﬀection.
150 Ibid., pp. 27–8, 36, 57–8, 60–3, 72, 122, 128, 150, 173, 182–4, 200, and see e.g. Young to Halifax,
8 Aug. 1947, Halifax papers, A.2.278.96. The ‘ falling asleep’ canard was repeated on BBC Newsnight,
10 Sept. 2001.
151 Young to Murray, 26 Jan. 1948, MS G. Murray, 99/8–9; compare Young, Baldwin, p. 11, with
Baldwin in Jones, Diary with letters, p. 527, and, for his decline from 1945, pp. 538, 541.
152 Young, Baldwin, pp. 57–8, 128, 167.
153 Ibid., pp. 122, 162; Young to W. Baldwin, 4 Apr. 1949, CUL MS Add. 7938.
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seized on an account from Citrine, the TUC secretary, about Baldwin ﬁnding
in 1935 that trade union leaders were ready to assist rearmament but then
(as Young understood it) failing to pursue discussions, a story which conﬁrmed
his disenchantment with his subject, not any eﬀort to substantiate it.154 Many
of these various claims, derived from or made central by Young’s psychological
speculations, became standard elements in future accounts of Baldwin’s life.
I V
Young’s book was serialized in The Sunday Times, noticed prominently in many
newspapers and journals, and won the 1952 James Tait Black prize for biography.
Nevertheless, responses to it were mixed. Unlike Eden, Beaverbrook, and
Churchill, neither those who had initiated the book ( Jones, Fry, and Davidson)
nor Baldwin’s executors (his two sons) saw any draft or proofs. They were
variously dismayed, appalled, or furious. Reviewers, even Baldwin’s former
colleagues and admirers Cooper and Elliot, accepted all or much of Young’s
interpretation. Amery thought it ‘a brilliant study’, and mysteriously supposed
that ‘no one would have enjoyed [it] more than Baldwin himself ’. But even while
accepting the book’s substance, others criticized its literary style and tone :
‘uneven’, ‘oblique’, ‘ irritable ’, ‘ limp and tired ’.155 Churchill’s private judge-
ment should also be noted: ‘ ill-natured’, ‘ ill-conceived’, a ‘very inadequate ap-
preciation of Mr. Baldwin’.156 Young was so disappointed by the ‘bleak and
unfriendly reception ’, that he asked Jones to take over his commission to write
Baldwin’s entry for The dictionary of national biography.157
However, the book did provoke the beginnings of a reaction in Baldwin’s
favour, encouraged by the Conservative political revival of the early 1950s.
Perhaps licensed by Churchill’s address at the Baldwin memorial, a 1953
Conservative Political Centre pamphlet on Great Conservatives included Baldwin
(and Chamberlain), in a Humphry Berkeley essay directed against ‘ socialist
untruths and misrepresentations ’. In letters to the press criticizing Young’s
reviewers, Bassett publicized his reinterpretation of Baldwin’s ‘appalling frank-
ness ’.158 David Somervell, a public school master, historian and brother of
Baldwin’s last attorney-general, published a short essay and four of Baldwin’s
speeches in reply to Young’s strictures, which stressed Baldwin’s domestic record,
insisted that the 1935 election had been won on rearmament and, given inter-
national conditions and British opinion in the 1930s, asked how anyone, even
154 Young–Citrine exchange, 20, 22, 23 June 1948, Citrine papers 10/1; Young to W. Baldwin,
4 Apr. 1949, 21 Feb. 1950, CUL MS Add. 7938; Young, Baldwin, p. 204, and see below p. 163.
155 Cuttings in W. Baldwin papers, including Amery in Spectator, 14 Nov. 1952.
156 Pitbaldo to Gisborne, 7 Oct. 1952, PREM 11/239.
157 Young to Jones, 6 Jan. 1953, Jones papers, A7/61.
158 Berkeley to Mrs N. Chamberlain, 1 Sept. 1952, NC 11/1/77, describing his unfulﬁlled plan for a
joint biography of Baldwin and Chamberlain; W. Baldwin papers contain a collection of Bassett’s
letters to newspapers.
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Churchill, could have done more. He even had the temerity to challenge
The gathering storm as containing passages ‘open to serious criticism’, and suggested
that in future editions Churchill should consider revising his verdict on
Baldwin.159
The most substantial reply came from Windham Baldwin, the son whose
campaign to vindicate his father had begun with his asking Churchill to speak at
the Astley memorial.160 He had tried to help Young in his early research, but as
Young’s nervous complaints as well as his line of interpretation became apparent
he decided that he should not attempt to inﬂuence the book’s arguments. Instead,
even before Young had ﬁnished his book he began collecting material for a
published response, which developed into an answer to the whole post-war
denigration of his father, presented in biographical form.161 Windham Baldwin
was a businessman, not a historian or writer, and had no particular political
attachments. Nor had his father conﬁded political information and opinions to
him. But he had one great advantage over other commentators : his utter disbelief
in the statements made since 1940 about his father’s character, which made him
immune to the interpretation of 1930s government and politics that depended on
his supposed character ﬂaws. He also had explanations of how the criticisms had
developed and persisted, giving him what was at that time a further interpretative
strength: distrust of the ostensibly most knowledgeable writers. When Jones asked
for his comments on Young’s book to help him in writing the Dictionary of national
biography article, Windham declined in a remarkable reasoned criticism of Jones’s
own published views on Baldwin. Jones, a man with vast experience of public life,
was startled into the comment that ‘ in a long life I cannot recall receiving a letter
which has so shaken me’. It had some eﬀect : Jones collected fresh opinions
from Baldwin’s former oﬃcials, read the Bassett article and reread Baldwin’s
defence speeches, so that even while incorporating some of Young’s material his
article was more circumspect than his earlier memoir.162 In Windham’s book, the
belittlement was explained as a legacy from interwar party enmities and frus-
trations, Baldwin’s long struggles with Beaverbrook, Rothermere and their
newspapers, and his outspoken scepticism about ‘ intellectuals ’.163 His private
explanations were more pungent, but also perceptive. Amery, Hoare, Cooper,
Elliott, and most of Baldwin’s other ministerial colleagues had been ‘debrained
and dememorized by … false post-war propaganda’ and the ‘Heroic Virus
159 D. C. Somervell, Stanley Baldwin : an examination of some features of Mr G. M. Young’s biography
(London, 1953), esp. pp. 22–3, 34, 40–1, 46–7, 51, and see his essay on Baldwin in the History Today
collection, British Prime Ministers (London, 1953), pp. 154–67. His brother’s papers contain appreciative
letters : Bodleian Library MS Eng. c.6565/294–320.
160 The brieﬁng notes he prepared for Churchill even implied that he might wish to retract the
worst of the accusations in The gathering storm : W. Baldwin notes, c. May 1950, CHUR 2/312.
161 See correspondence in CULMS Add. 7938, esp. W. Baldwin to Davidson, 13 May 1952. He also
acceded to Young’s demands for revised royalty payments from sympathy for his ‘age and inﬁrmity’.
His co-executor, Oliver Baldwin, took no serious interest in Young’s book.
162 Jones–W. Baldwin exchange, 16–31 Mar. 1953, ibid. ; June–July 1953 material in Jones papers,
A7, AA1, W7. 163 Baldwin, My father, pp. 155–69.
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spread by Churchill ’. Nor had the professional experts done better : the
‘professors of All Fool’s College, Oxford and almost all historians … failed
to comprehend, partly through dealing in second-hand sources, partly
through prejudice, and partly through susceptibility to propaganda and winston-
worship’.164
Windham Baldwin assembled some unpublished political material, and
obtained from Citrine the full story of Baldwin’s 1935 enquiries about TUC atti-
tudes on rearmament, conﬁrming that Bevin, not Baldwin, had let the prospective
discussions lapse.165 But in fulﬁlment of his father’s will he sent Baldwin’s political
papers to Cambridge University Library. He made little use of these papers
himself, because having identiﬁed the two root charges against Baldwin he
understood that their weaknesses would be best exposed by other sources. Against
the assertions about his character and particularly Young’s damaging innuendos
about its formation, Windham used his own knowledge and family papers which
Young had largely ignored. His candour about Baldwin’s schoolboy punishment
for some mildly indecent scribblings had the unintended eﬀect of encouraging
further psychological interpretations of his politics. But Windham’s own emphasis
was on his father’s contented childhood and happy marriage ; his religious faith,
moral earnestness, and ethic of service ; his sincerity, modesty, and straightfor-
wardness ; his vigour, crispness in despatch of business, and trust in delegation to
experts ; and his shy, highly strung temperament which made public meetings an
agony – in displaying a man who was not capable of deception, neglecting duty,
or chasing popularity.166 Against the accusations about rearmament he grasped,
as the academics had not done, that as the central issue was his father’s public
statements, extensive study of his speeches was required. He bought the House
of Commons debates for 1932 to 1937 to add to volumes of newspaper cuttings
of Baldwin’s extra-parliamentary speeches, and from these demonstrated his
extensive and detailed engagement in foreign and defence debates. He showed,
as none since Hogg had done, the relentless Labour and Liberal opposition to
rearmament, and he went further than Somervell in stating not just that
The gathering storm contained ‘unreasonable arguments and aspersions ’ but even
that Churchill’s speeches in 1932–6 were unrealistic and often ‘superﬁcial
and self-contradictory’.167 He argued that Bassett’s revised interpretation of the
November 1936 passages did not go far enough, because Baldwin had not meant
that heavy rearmament was postponed in 1933–4: nothing larger than the
successive RAF increases had been considered necessary or desirable, given
164 W. Baldwin to Davidson, 13, 22 May 1952, CUL Add. MS 7938, and 6 May 1955, 10 Sept. 1958,
Davidson papers, 310, 311. The Fellows of All Soul’s College included Young, Rowse, and Salter. See
Ramsden, Man of the century, pp. 116–28, 142–3, 209, 528, for examples of this ‘winston-worship’ in the
historical profession, notably from Rowse and A. J. P. Taylor but including Bryant, who, however,
squared it with continued admiration for Baldwin, expressed periodically in his Illustrated London News
column.
165 W. Baldwin–Citrine letters, Nov. 1952–Mar. 1953, Citrine papers, 10/1; Baldwin, My father,
pp. 344–5. 166 Baldwin, My father, chs. I–VII, pp. 326–8. 167 Ibid., pp. 278–86.
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contemporary information about German armaments, international obligations
to seek disarmament, and a continuing prospect of arms limitation. Nevertheless,
the government had begun rearmament in 1934, and Baldwin’s careful advocacy
had persuaded an electoral majority to accept an unequivocal commitment to
increased rearmament at the 1935 election. The phrase ‘no great armaments ’
was an assurance ‘ to pacify the paciﬁsts ’ that the government was not war-
mongering.168 As Windham privately summarized his interpretation, with ‘skill
and courage’ Baldwin had ‘walked the ﬁnest tightrope’ between precipitate re-
armament which would have divided the nation and escalated international
tensions, and inadequate rearmament which would have left Britain defenceless
in 1940. That Britain had withstood the unexpected disintegration of Belgian
and French resistance was testimony to the work begun in the mid-1930s. The
prevailing interpretations should be inverted. It was not on the constitutional
issues of 1926 and 1936 but on rearmament in 1934–5 that Baldwin did
his ‘most diﬃcult and miraculous ’ work. Rightly understood, Baldwin, not
Churchill, was the heroic ﬁgure of the 1930s.169
There would have been another signiﬁcant book on these issues in the 1950s,
but for a further entanglement with the Cabinet Oﬃce’s vigilance over oﬃcial
papers. Sir Graham Vincent, a former Downing Street and Committee of Im-
perial Defence oﬃcial who also wished to vindicate Baldwin’s memory, oﬀered to
collaborate with Windham Baldwin in developing suggestions made in his book
that delays in rearmament were caused primarily by deﬁciencies in the apparatus
of defence staﬀ and committees. Such a study would have had a considerable
impact on the debate, and it had a promising start. In a replay of his father’s
request to the prime minister of the day on Young’s behalf, in 1957 Windham
asked Harold Macmillan, an old friend, for access to Cabinet Oﬃce records,
though now, more pertinently, to its defence papers. Again on the principle of
allowing special facilities for relatives defending a statesman’s injured reputation,
Macmillan and Brook agreed to the request. One discovery by Vincent
produced further evidence of the weight of received opinion on the 1930s.
Cabinet Oﬃce oﬃcials were surprised and worried to ﬁnd that in July 1936
Baldwin had spoken to Churchill and the defence deputation of having won
the 1935 election on a ‘perfectly free hand on arms ’. As this statement was not
reported in The gathering storm’s account of the meeting and contradicted
Churchill’s notorious accusation against Baldwin, there was concern over
whether it would be ‘politically expedient to reveal it now’. Eventually, however,
publication of the whole book was prevented by the Cabinet Oﬃce’s contorted
eﬀorts to stop conﬁdential information being used in memoirs by former oﬃcials.
As it was obvious from the draft that Vincent rather Windham Baldwin was
168 Ibid., ch. XIII, pp. 242–3, 269–72.
169 W. Baldwin to Davidson, 27 Oct. 1952, 10 Sept. 1958, Davidson papers, 308, 311; to Jones,
29 Mar. 1953, CUL MS Add. 7938; to Barber, 26 Feb. 1959, W. Baldwin papers ; Baldwin, My father,
p. 315.
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the main author, and as the latter rejected as dishonest Brook’s suggestion that he
should present it as his own sole work, the Cabinet Oﬃce felt it had to insist on a
convention that debarred civil servants from publishing books using oﬃcial
documents.170
V
Publishers had been nervous about Windham Baldwin’s biography, not least
because Churchill was still prime minister when they assessed it : he himself took
advice over possible libels, and disguised Churchill’s name when printing an
extract from a document. Publishers also thought the book a ‘risk ’ because
Baldwin remained unpopular, and was ‘a permanent Aunt Sally for every pol-
itical journalist ’.171 Predictably, this turned out to be true in the Beaverbrook and
Labour press. But other reviewers were impressed, even moved, by the account of
Baldwin’s character, and most, including Churchill’s son, now agreed that
Young’s book had been too harsh. A few accepted that the accusations about
the 1935 election and November 1936 passages were unjust, but more commonly
the contrast between the book and received opinion produced confusion. Some
concluded that as an act of ‘ﬁlial piety ’ its case was overstated. Others took the
critical interpretation back a stage : Baldwin’s personal merits were admitted,
but it was argued that good intentions were no substitute for tough-mindedness
on international and economic problems.172
Nevertheless Windham Baldwin’s book began to change informed assessments
of Baldwin. At the very least these became less critical, if only because attempts to
accommodate his account made these assessments more complicated. Broader
opinion was also gradually becoming less hostile. As the Second World War
receded and as the Cold War advanced, earlier summary views and moral
simplicities about British policy in the 1930s could seem less convincing. As
Conservative political dominance and acceptance of the welfare state continued
through the 1950s, a more favourable perspective became possible, that of
Baldwin as a forerunner of the ‘progressive ’ Conservatism of Butler and
170 PREM 11/2231 and CAB21/5819, esp. Trend to Brook, 18 Apr., and Brook to Macmillan, 6,
7 June 1958. For the tortuous Cabinet Oﬃce policing of civil service memoirs and diaries in the
1950s (including those of its own former members, Jones and Hankey), see Naylor, A man and an
institution, pp. 274–7, 285–9. Copies of the Vincent–Baldwin typescript are in W. Baldwin papers, and
the Brotherton Library archives, University of Leeds.
171 Baldwin, My father, p. 115, for ‘X’ ; Allen and Unwin report, Feb. 1955, and related material in
W. Baldwin papers. Three other publishers had rejected the book, one also fearing ‘promotional ’
problems. But the main diﬃculty was an unwieldly ﬁrst draft, which Windham recast with advice from
his author-cousins, Denis Mackail and Monica Baldwin, and encouragement from Davidson, Bassett,
and J. R. M. Butler, the Cambridge historian, member of the Cabinet Oﬃce historical section, and
son of Dr Butler of Harrow.
172 W. Baldwin papers include a collection of cuttings, all 1956: see e.g. Daily Express, 19 Jan., and
New Statesman, 20 Jan., for hostility ; R. Churchill in Truth, 27 Jan. ; Elliot in Daily Telegraph, 20 Jan.,
andTimes Literary Supplement, 10 Feb., accepting the point about 1935; Pakenham inObserver, 22 Jan., and
Ensor in Sunday Times, 29 Jan., for the other reactions.
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Macmillan. Within Conservative opinion this was assisted by the eﬀorts of
Davidson, who distributed copies of Windham Baldwin’s book to national and
regional party oﬃcials and university Conservative societies, and later helped
ensure a wide circulation for an admiring pamphlet on Baldwin by a free-lance
Conservative journalist, prote´ge´ of Bryant, and former Chamberlainite,
D. H. Barber.173 Earlier certainties among intellectuals also started to yield as
specialist historians of twentieth-century British politics began to emerge.
Robert Blake provides one register of these shifts. While working for
Beaverbrook in the early 1950s, he wrote Evening Standard reviews of Young’s and
Somervell’s books which accepted Churchill’s verdict and much of Young’s
account : ‘history ’, he wrote, would probably judge Baldwin as ‘ the most disas-
trous Prime Minister … since … Lord North ’. He nevertheless thought Young’s
book poor and unscholarly, and realized the possibilities of following his own
far-superior biography of Bonar Law with a major study of ‘The age of Baldwin’.
He was deterred when Beaverbrook declared that he was already engaged on
a book with exactly that title, and refused Blake access to his hoard of political
archives.174 Once again Beaverbrook had a malign inﬂuence on Baldwin’s
reputation: although this work was never completed it delayed a full, expert,
historical re-examination of his career. But in 1960 Blake did publish an inﬂu-
ential essay on Baldwin, which used Windham Baldwin’s biography – ‘ the only
satisfactory portrait ’ of him – to produce a more favourable assessment. The
worst of the Guilty men–Churchill–Young accusations on rearmament were
repudiated, and it was recognized, as Windham had suggested but no other
commentator had noted, that as government records remained closed the
‘ full facts ’ were not yet available. Baldwin, argued Blake, had cleansed public life
after the squalid dealings of Lloyd George (who in this respect now replaced
Baldwin as the modern ‘Lord North’), and created the modern ‘one-nation’
Conservatism that was being consolidated in the 1950s. Yet after removing the
rearmament controversy from the core of the interpretation, Blake replaced
it with elements stressed by Young and Jones : a half ‘Celt ’ who embodied
‘Englishness ’, a preoccupation with Lloyd George, and if not ‘ indolence ’ then a
failure to try hard enough.175
The ﬁrst of these – the notion of Baldwin’s representativeness – was also
oﬀered by the ﬁrst historians to write general histories of the interwar years.
173 List, Dec. 1956, Davidson papers, 311; Davidson to W. Baldwin, 17 Dec. 1959, 14 Dec. 1960,
W. Baldwin papers; D. H. Barber, Stanley Baldwin: patriot statesman (privately published, 1959), and see
his autobiography, Twenty years of free-lancing (London, 1947).
174 Evening Standard, 14 Nov. 1952, 25 Sept. 1953; Blake notes, 22 Sept. 1952, and Blake–Beaverbrook
letters, Sept. 1955, Mar. 1956, Beaverbrook papers, C/43–5. It is not clear whether Beaverbook had
indeed started this book, or whether Blake gave him the idea. His assistants’ research material remains
in his papers, section G/5, but the only completed and published parts were The Decline and Fall of Lloyd
George (London, 1963) and, posthumously, The abdication of King Edward VIII (London, 1966). Blake
turned instead to the biography of Disraeli.
175 R. Blake, ‘Baldwin and the right ’, in J. Raymond, ed., The Baldwin age (London, 1960), pp. 25–65,
and see R. Blake, The Conservative party from Peel to Churchill (London, 1970; 1972 edn), pp. 215–38.
166 P H I L I P W I L L I AM S ON
Mowat and A. J. P. Taylor acquitted Baldwin of deceit and neglect, and
acknowledged that he had strengths as well as weaknesses. Although they diﬀered
over whether he had aggravated (Mowat) or eased (Taylor) class bitterness in the
1920s, both sought to explain his dominance by placing him ﬁrmly in the context
of his times. Baldwin no longer bore a special personal responsibility for the ills of
the 1920s and 1930s. Rather, his signiﬁcance was that he embodied and inter-
preted the mood of the British people at the time, a view which in some later
accounts developed into a leading explanation of his political success.176
By the 1960s Baldwin was ceasing to be a subject of political controversy. Public
ﬁgures with a personal stake in the Guilty men and Churchillian interpretations
were falling silent, and political life had moved on. Churchill’s death in 1965 was
particularly signiﬁcant ; once the aura of his living presence was removed and it
was no longer a solecism to be sceptical about his own version of his career, his
political opponents could seem less culpable. Baldwin was becoming a historical
ﬁgure, and as Mowat’s and Taylor’s volumes showed, as historical investigation of
interwar Britain proceeded it broadened into an examination both of many
more individuals and of the wider structures – economic, social, diplomatic, and
bureaucratic as well as party-political. This passage from politics into history was
symbolized by commemorations of the centenary of Baldwin’s birth in 1967 : a
House of Commons lunch chaired by the Speaker was attended and addressed
by prominent politicians from all three parties,177 and newspaper articles oﬀered
‘re-appraisals ’ of him which concentrated much more on his domestic politics
than on rearmament.178 The discussion of his career became more properly his-
torical with the adoption that same year of the ‘ thirty-year rule ’ on Public Record
Oﬃce ﬁles, which was anticipated or followed shortly afterwards by the opening
to historians of the papers of Baldwin and many of his associates, and by the
publication of interwar political diaries and documented memoirs. There was
soon, in Middlemas’s and Barnes’s biography, a life and times on the lines that
Baldwin thought he had commissioned in 1945, followed by studies embedding
his career in the histories of party, government, diplomacy, and policy, and able
to reveal the ‘ full facts ’ on foreign and defence issues. Again, as in 1937, several
interpretations of Baldwin’s career became possible. Although much of this
historical work retained a critical tone and older claims remained inﬂuential,
176 C. L. Mowat, ‘Baldwin restored? ’, Journal of Modern History, 27 (1955), pp. 169–74, and idem,
Britain between the wars, esp. pp. 195–7, 553–6, 558, 660; A. J. P. Taylor, British prime ministers and other
essays, ed. C. J. Wrigley (London, 1998), pp. 50–8 (1960 broadcast), and idem, English history, 1914–1945
(Oxford, 1965), esp. pp. 205, 227, 236, 387. For comment on the general theme, see Williamson,
Baldwin, pp. 8–9 and conclusion.
177 The organizing committee included Windham Baldwin, the Davidsons, R. A. Butler, and
Baldwin’s former secretaries, Fry, Vincent, Dugdale, Duﬀ, Neville Butler, and Geoﬀrey Lloyd. The
main speakers were Edward Heath, Harold Macmillan, Roy Jenkins, and Jo Grimond: Times,
15 July 1967.
178 R. Rhodes James, in Times, 14 July 1967, and C. Coote in Daily Telegraph, same date (contrasting
with his criticisms when reviewing Young’s book, ibid., 14 Nov. 1952) ; P. Norman in Sunday Times
Magazine, 30 July 1967, and a mellowed Attlee in Observer Colour Supplement, 6 Aug. 1967.
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the verdicts were now more reasoned and measured. For historians the earlier
hostile stereotype had gone, though it persisted as Baldwin’s public reputation;
the new feature was a gulf between the historical assessments and the popular
myth. Nor did the legacy of political partisanship immediately disappear. When
in the early 1980s several Conservative MPs campaigned for a statue of Baldwin
to be placed in the House of Commons lobby, it was blocked by Michael Foot,
now Labour party leader but still brandishing Guilty men. In the 1990s, however,
even this political residue had dissolved: not only a Conservative prime minister
but even his Labour successor could appeal to Baldwin as an exemplar of the
politics of social reconciliation.179
179 Williamson, Baldwin, pp. 6, 8.
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